Sex workers and the best interests of their children: Identifying issues faced by sex workers involved in custody and access legal proceedings

Julie E. DeWolf

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws

Graduate Program in Law Osgoode Hall Law School, York University Toronto, Ontario

September 2020

© Julie E. DeWolf, 2020
Sex worker parents often lose custody of their children. The purpose of this research was to determine what impact the status of a parent as a past or present sex worker has had on judicial decision-making in custody and access disputes.

Through doctrinal legal research, I explored judicial treatment of sex worker parents in custody and access disputes in Ontario Child Protection and Family Law case law. Parental involvement in sex work was often presented as an unfavourable aspect of the parent, or otherwise had a negative influence on their claim. Sex work was treated as a negative quality in a parent rather than an aspect of their life warranting further factual exploration. I argue that stigma against sex workers appears to carry more weight in custody and access disputes than evidence concerning the impact that a parent’s engagement in sex work has on a child.
Acknowledgements

Big thanks to Shelley M. Kierstead, Sonia Lawrence, Jennifer Nedelsky, and Susan Drummond for guidance; Travis DeWolf and Arla Good for treats, strolls, and patience; Victoria Love for the spark; and everyone at Maggie’s for the eye-opener.
# Table of contents

**ABSTRACT** II

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** III

**TABLE OF CONTENTS** IV

**INTRODUCTION** 1

**CHAPTER 1 – BACKGROUND** 3

- **Prostitution laws in Canada**
  - 1892-2014: Canada’s former prohibition model 4
  - The Bedford decision 4
  - 2014: Parliament enacts a Nordic model 6
  - A note on alternative models 8
- **Sex work and sex workers** 9
- **Stigma** 11
- **Sex worker parents**
  - A note on gender 13
  - Academic studies on sex worker parents 14
- **Moving forward** 18

**CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY** 19

- **Doctrinal legal research and analysis** 19
- **Limitations and alternative methods** 23

**CHAPTER 3: CHILD PROTECTION** 25

- **Past and present Child Protection legislative schemes in Ontario: Comparison of the former Child and Family Services Act with the new Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017** 26
  - The paramount purpose of both Acts is to promote the best interests of children 26
  - Proceedings are often triggered by third-party reports, following by society investigations 27
  - Temporary care hearings 27
  - The Child Protection hearing 28
    - First, a society must establish that a child is in need of protection 28
    - Second, the society must establish that a court order is necessary to protect the child moving forward 29
    - Courts may make orders for access 31
  - Any custody or access order must be in the best interests of the child 32
  - Admissibility of evidence regarding the past conduct of a parent 34
- **Overview of results** 35
  - Most children were found to be in need of protection due to a risk of physical harm 35
  - The most common protection order rendered was crown wardship, without access 36
- **Case law analysis** 37
  - Many Child Protection proceedings involving sex workers are triggered by third-party complaints and concerns regarding the parent’s work 38
  - Overcoming sex work supported one mother’s motion for custody at a hearing for temporary care and custody of the child during an adjournment 39
  - Courts often find that the children of sex workers were in need of protection due to a risk of physical harm arising out neglect and/or failure to supervise 40
Courts have referred to parental engagement in sex work when considering what order is in the best interests of the child. The child’s need for stability, permanence, and structure is considered. Continuity of the child’s care and the ongoing risk of physical harm are also evaluated.

Sex work as part of a negative description of a parent is a concerning factor in child custody and access disputes.

**Conclusion**

**Chapter 4: Family Law**

Family Law legislation: The Ontario Children’s Law Reform Act and the Federal Divorce Act

- Paramount purpose
- Family Law proceedings are commenced by application to the Court
- Available orders
- Any custody or access order must be in the best interests of the child
- Past conduct of a parent
- A note on Bill C-78: Amendments to the Divorce Act

Overview of Results

Law & Analysis

- Parents involved in sex work at the time of hearing
- Treatment of past involvement in sex work

Conclusion

**Chapter 5: Discussion**

The case law confirms key findings of the sociological and sociolegal research.

- No apparent impact on case law from Bedford
- Case law suggests that, in custody and access disputes, courts may rely more upon stigma against sex work and sex workers than on evidence
- Areas for future research

Conclusion

**Bibliography**

- Legislation
- Jurisprudence
- Secondary sources

**Appendix A: Coding Tables**

- Child Protection
- Family Law

**Appendix B: Chart Comparing Relevant Child Protection Legislative Provisions**

**Appendix C: Chart Comparing Relevant Family Law Legislative Provisions**
Introduction

I run a small legal clinic where I provide free summary legal advice for sex workers in cooperation with Maggie’s: Toronto Sex Workers’ Action Project (“Maggie’s”). Maggie’s is a non-profit organization run by and for sex workers in Toronto.

At first, I expected that most of my clients would seek advice in the criminal context. Following amendments to the prostitution provisions of the Criminal Code in 2014, it is no longer a crime to communicate in public for the purpose of selling sexual services in Canada. Sex workers nevertheless still risk running into trouble with the law.¹ For example, the Criminal Code prohibits communicating for the purpose of obtaining sexual services, meaning that clients of sex workers commit an offense with each transaction.² The Criminal Code also prohibits all communications regarding the commodification of sexual services near schools or playgrounds; stopping or impeding pedestrian or vehicular traffic for the purpose of selling sexual services; and advertising sexual services on behalf of another person (i.e., a business partner).³

I was wrong. Many of my clients are mothers who are involved in or threatened with Family Law or Child Protection proceedings and fear losing their children if they are outed as sex workers. Unfortunately, I found it challenging to provide them with legal advice because I was unable to find any resources on the challenges a sex worker might expect to face during custody and access proceedings.

The purpose of this research was to understand the impact that parental engagement in sex work has had on custody and access proceedings in Ontario. My research question is as follows:

---

¹ In Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 [Bedford], the Supreme Court of Canada struck down provisions in the Criminal Code, RSC, 1985, c C-46 governing the commodification of sexual services for violating s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
² Criminal Code, ibid, s 286.2.
³ Ibid, ss 231 (1)-(2), 286.4, 286.5 (1)-(2).
In reported decisions from Family Law and Child Protection proceedings involving claims for custody and access, what impact has the status of a parent as a past or present sex worker had on judicial decision-making?

I explored judicial consideration and treatment of parental involvement in sex work in custody and access proceedings brought under Ontario Child Protection legislation (the Child and Family Services Act and the Child, Youth, and Family Services Act, 2017) and Family Law legislation (the Children’s Law Reform Act and the Divorce Act). 4

I found that, in many cases, judges appeared to rely upon stigma and assumptions about sex work and sex workers instead of on evidence about the specific sex worker parent, their work, and any impact on the child. Parents were often labeled as prostitutes early on in decisions, followed by seemingly adverse inferences about the sex worker’s parenting abilities based on that status. I thus argue that stigma against sex work and sex workers appears to carry more weight in custody and access disputes than evidence concerning the impact that a parent’s engagement in sex work has on a child.

Chapter 1 begins with an overview of the history of Canada’s prostitution laws, followed by a description of what I have come to learn about sex worker parents. I explain the status of the emerging field of research on the intersections between parenthood and sex work, define key terms, and provide a glimpse of the diverse professional and personal lives of sex workers.

In Chapter 2, I describe my research method. Briefly, I took a positivist approach to doctrinal legal research to determine how a parent’s status as a sex worker has been treated by Family Law and Child Protection courts from January 1, 2010 to March 2020.

Chapters 3 and 4 are the heart of this work. They contain legal analyses of case law that demonstrate how a parent’s status as a sex work has been considered and applied in Child Protection and Family Law proceedings where custody and access of a child is disputed. In Chapter 5 I discuss key conclusions and observations and suggest areas for future research.

Chapter 1 – Background

In this chapter, I set out the theoretical framework for my research question. I start with an overview of Canada’s past and present models of regulating prostitution under the Criminal Code. While my research concerns Child Protection and Family Law, criminal prostitution laws regulate the lives and careers of sex workers. I then define sex work, sex workers, and stigma, and describe the stigma experienced by sex workers.

The balance is dedicated to literature by and about sex worker parents, including anthologies, blog posts, activist pieces, and academic (sociological and sociolegal) studies. We see that sex worker parents are abundant yet understudied; encounter high rates of stigma and scrutiny; suffer disproportionately high child apprehension rates; and often face at least one social, economic, or health impediment that can impede parenting. However, there is a lack of literature regarding the legal impact of parental involvement in sex work on Child Protection and Family Law custody and access proceedings.

I conclude by explaining how my legal research contributes to the field of study on sex work and parenting. As I later describe in my methodology chapter, I explored this impact by reviewing judicial analyses within Ontario case law.

______________________________

5 Criminal Code, supra note 1.
7 Juliana Piccillo, “We’re here. We’re whores. We’re parenting.” (February 20, 2018) online: Red Umbrella Babies: Sex work & Parenting, an anthology <https://www.redumbrellababies.com/single-post/2018/02/20/Were-here-Were-whores-Were-parenting>.
8 Rebecca Bromwich & Monique Marie Dejong, eds, Mothers, mothering and sex work (Brampton, ON: Demeter Press, 2015) at 14.
9 See generally, Bromwich & Dejong, ibid.
Prostitution laws in Canada

1892-2014: Canada’s former prohibition model

Up until 2014, the *Criminal Code* prescribed a prohibition model of regulating the purchase and sale of sexual services. Prohibition models work to eliminate prostitution based on the assumption that sex work is inherently violent and harmful.\(^\text{12}\)

The *Criminal Code* did not explicitly prohibit the sale of one’s own sexual services but contained broad prohibitions against almost every behaviour that a sex worker would have to engage in in order to enter into a transaction with a client. The following actions related to sex work were prohibited under the *Criminal Code* from its enactment in 1892 to 2014:\(^\text{13}\)

1) In any manner, communicating or attempting to communicate in a public place or in any place open to public view with any person for the purpose of selling or obtaining sexual services.\(^\text{14}\)

2) Keeping, being in, or having charge or control of a common bawdy-house.\(^\text{15}\) A “common bawdy-house” was defined as a place kept, occupied, or resorted to by one or more persons for the purpose of prostitution or the practice of acts of indecency.\(^\text{16}\)

3) Living wholly or in part on the avails of prostitution of another person.\(^\text{17}\) Known as the “pimping provision”, this prohibition could theoretically capture employees of or family members living with sex workers.

The **Bedford** decision

In 2010, three sex workers from Ontario sought declarations that the following provisions of the *Criminal Code* governing prostitution violated their section 7 *Charter* right to life, liberty, and security of the person:


\(^\text{13}\) The *Criminal Code*, 1892, SC 1892, c 29; *Criminal Code*, *ibid*.

\(^\text{14}\) *Criminal Code*, *ibid*, s 213(1)(b) (repealed).

\(^\text{15}\) *Ibid*, s 210(1)-(2) (repealed).

\(^\text{16}\) *Ibid*, s 197(1) (repealed).

\(^\text{17}\) *Ibid*, s 212(1)(j) (repealed).
1) the prohibition against keeping or being in a common bawdy-house;
2) the prohibition against living on the avails of prostitution; and
3) the prohibition against communicating in public for the purposes of prostitution.\(^{18}\)

Their application went before the Supreme Court of Canada ("SCC") in 2013.\(^{19}\) The SCC held that all of the impugned provisions were inconsistent with section 7 of the Charter. First, the Court held that the harm suffered by sex workers as a result of the prohibition against keeping a bawdy house—preventing sex workers from working in safer fixed indoor locations and from resorting to safe houses—was grossly disproportionate to the purpose of deterring community disruption.\(^{20}\)

Second, the SCC held that the prohibition against living off the avails of prostitution, targeted at parasitic and exploitative pimps, was overbroad in that it also captured those who could increase the safety and security of sex workers, such as drivers, managers, bodyguards, accountants, receptionists, or anyone else involved in business with sex workers.\(^{21}\)

Third, the SCC held purpose of the prohibition against communicating in public for the purpose of prostitution—taking prostitution off the street in order to prevent public nuisance—was grossly disproportionate to the negative impact the law had on the safety and lives of sex workers who were thus prevented from screening potential clients for intoxication and propensity to violence.\(^{22}\)

The Court ordered a declaration of invalidity for the three impugned decisions, suspended for one year to allow Parliament time to prepare amending legislation.\(^{23}\)

\(^{18}\) *Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford*, 2010 ONSC 4264.
\(^{19}\) *Bedford*, supra note 1.
\(^{20}\) *Ibid* at paras 133-136.
\(^{21}\) *Ibid* at paras 139-144.
\(^{22}\) *Ibid* at para 159.
\(^{23}\) *Ibid* at para 169.
In 2014, Parliament amended the *Criminal Code* to implement a Nordic model of regulating sex work that is in effect today.\(^{24}\) The commodification of sex work remains criminalized, but the laws target purchasers of sexual services (*i.e.*, the clients of sex workers) instead of sex workers. Parliament replaced the provisions struck down in *Bedford* with the following offenses:

1) **Purchasing offense**: it is an offense to obtain the sexual services of a person for consideration or to communicate in any place for the purpose of obtaining the sexual services of a person.\(^{25}\) Sex workers, however, are not prohibited from communicating about the sale of their own sexual services.\(^{26}\)

2) **Advertising offense**: it is an offense to knowingly advertise an offer to provide sexual services for consideration,\(^{27}\) unless the advertisement relates only to the seller’s own sexual services.\(^{28}\)

3) **Material benefit offense**: it is an offense to receive a financial or other material benefit obtained by or derived from the commission of a purchase of sexual services. Again, sex workers are exempted if they receive a material benefit from the sale of their own sexual services.\(^{29}\)

The material benefit offense does not prevent sex workers from entering into certain family and business relationships.\(^{30}\) Exceptions include legitimate living arrangements (*i.e.*, children, spouses, roommates); legal or moral obligations (*e.g.*, supporting a disabled parent, or giving gifts); goods and services offered

\(^{24}\) *Bill C-36, the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act*, SC 2014, c 25 (assented to November 6, 2014). Of note, on February 21, 2020, Justice McKay of the Ontario Court of Justice declared that section 286.4 (advertising ban) violates s. 2(b) of the *Charter*, *supra* note 1, and sections 286.3 (procuring), and 286.2 (material benefits provision) violate section 7 of the *Charter*, all in manners that were not justified under s. 1. See: *R v Anwar*, 2020 ONCJ 103 at para 7. It remains to be seen whether a higher court will rule that the provisions are of no force or effect.

\(^{25}\) *Criminal code, supra* note 1, s 286.1.

\(^{26}\) *Ibid*, s 286.5(2).

\(^{27}\) *Ibid*, s 286.4.

\(^{28}\) *Ibid*, s 286.5(2).

\(^{29}\) *Ibid*, s 286.2.

\(^{30}\) *Ibid*, s 286.2(4).
to the general public (e.g., accountants, landlords, pharmacists, security companies); and goods and services offered informally for fair value (e.g., babysitting or protective services).  

Pre- and post-Bedford, the Criminal Code prohibits stopping or impeding traffic for the purpose of offering, providing, or obtaining sexual services for consideration and communicating with any person—for the purpose of offering or providing sexual services for consideration—in a public place, or in any place open to public view, that is or is next to a school ground, playground, or daycare centre.

As noted, Canada’s post-Bedford legislative scheme is known as a “Nordic Model” for controlling sex work. Under a Nordic Model, also implemented in Sweden, Norway, and Iceland, persons who sell sexual services are not subject to criminal sanctions, but their clients are. Many sex workers are unhappy with Canada’s Nordic model. Sex worker and activist Amy Lebovitch condemns Canada’s “terrible new laws” that were developed without input from the community that would be governed by them. Bromwich & DeJong assert that the “intended normative effect” of a Nordic model is to “continue to stigmatize and socially condemn the sex trade but to shift the social stigma from the sex workers to the consumers.” According to the Global Network of Sex Work Projects, Nordic models “do not reduce the scale of sex work, but they do make sex workers more vulnerable.” Many sex workers are forced to operate and negotiate contracts with clients out of public view where they are at risk of violence and exploitation. Nordic models “prevent[s] sex workers from working openly, and from receiving the benefits of labour law and contract law.” Elements of regular (i.e., “legal”) employment—such as consistent income, regular hours, benefits such paid time off for medical, family, or personal emergencies—are unlikely to be available.

---

31 Ibid, s 286.2(4)(a)-(d); Canada Department of Justice, Prostitution Criminal Law Reform: Bill C-36, the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act – Fact Sheet (September 14, 2018) online: Government of Canada, Department of Justice <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/other-autre/c36fs_fi/>.
32 Criminal Code, ibid, ss 213(1), (1.1), (2).
33 Bromwich & DeJong, supra note 8 at 9.
34 Ibid at 10.
36 Ibid at 12.
37 Ibid at 10-9-13.
39 Ibid at 10.
Like prohibition models, an assumption behind Nordic models is that sex work is harmful to society. Publications from Parliament regarding the post-\textit{Bedford} amendments perpetuate a harm-based view of sex work. Material published by the Department of Justice explaining the amendments confirms that the overall objectives of the new legislative scheme are to “protect those who sell their own sexual services; protect communities, and especially children, from the harms caused by prostitution; and reduce the demand for prostitution and its incidence.”\textsuperscript{40} The publication explains that the government seeks to denounce and prohibit “the purchase of sexual services, ... and the institutionalization of prostitution through commercial enterprises, such as strip clubs, massage parlours and escort agencies that offer sexual services for sale.”\textsuperscript{41}

Government denunciation of sex work in the criminal context can have extended social and legal consequences for sex workers. Bromwich & DeJong argue that the overall governance of sex work extends beyond criminality and, directly or indirectly, into other regulatory regimes.\textsuperscript{42} I suggest that the stigma against sex work, in part perpetuated by the Nordic model of governance provided in the \textit{Criminal Code}, has extended into Child Protection and Family Law proceedings.

\textit{A note on alternative models}

There are other options for regulating sex work that Parliament can consider aside from prohibition and Nordic models. Certain Canadian politicians are currently advocating that Canada reconsider its approach. Laurel Collins, Member of Parliament for Victoria, British Columbia, recognizes the dangers that the current Nordic Model creates for sex workers by “criminaliz[ing] the environments and the very things that would keep the workers safe” and is pushing for Parliament to consider implementing a model that would work to protect sex workers from violence.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{40} Department of Justice, \textit{supra} note 31.
\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{42} Bromwich & DeJong, \textit{supra} note 8 at 12-13.
\textsuperscript{43} House of Commons Debates, 43-1, No 014 (February 4, 2020) at 881, 891 (Hon Laurel Collins).
New Zealand, for example, has decriminalized sex work.\textsuperscript{44} In June 2003, New Zealand became the first country to decriminalize sex work with the passage of the \textit{Prostitution Reform Act, 2003}.\textsuperscript{45} The purpose of that Act was to “enable sex workers to have and access the same protections afforded to other workers” and had the following goals:

- safeguard the human rights of sex workers;
- protect sex workers from exploitation;
- promote the welfare and occupational safety and health of sex workers;
- create an environment conducive to public health; and
- protect children from exploitation in relation to prostitution.\textsuperscript{46}

Sex workers and their clients have the right to freely contract for services. They are able to implement effective safety measures, such as performing background checks on clients, and have employment rights. Professor Putu Duff, one of Canada’s leading academics on sex work and sex workers, recommends that Canada follow New Zealand’s lead and decriminalize sex work. According to Duff, “decriminalization would foster the collectivization and empowerment of sex workers and decrease exposure to workplace and partner violence and improving peer social support networks and access to care”.\textsuperscript{47}

\textbf{Sex work and sex workers}

I adopt the terms sex work and sex worker for this research, words advocated for by many activists within the sex worker community.\textsuperscript{48} Incorporation of the words “work” and “worker” acknowledge that sex work is “socially legitimate, important, and valuable work.”\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{44} New Zealand \textit{Prostitution Reform Act}, 2003 (NZ), 2003 No 28.
\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Ibid}. Regarding the protection of children, it is noteworthy that the New Zealand Parliament was concerned with protecting children from “exploitation in relation to prostitution”. In contrast, the Canadian Department of Justice sought broadly to protect children from “harms caused by prostitution.”\textsuperscript{47}
\textsuperscript{48} See: Bromwich & Dejong, \textit{ supra} note 8; van der Meulen, Durisin, & Love, \textit{ supra} note 6; Lebovitch & Ferries, \textit{ supra} note 35
\textsuperscript{49} Maggie’s, “Chapter 15: Maggie’s Toronto Sex Workers Action Project” in Lebovitch & Ferris, \textit{ibid} at 221.
Bromwich & DeJong describe sex work as “the voluntary exchange of sexual services for money.”

Prostitution, in contrast, is “the exchange of sexual services for money, whether voluntary or involuntary” and can include victims of sex trafficking. Sex work, then, always requires a level of choice and agency. Many sex workers are pushing to have sex work recognized as valid and socially acceptable work and believe that lumping their work into a category that includes victims of human trafficking will hinder their fight for legitimacy.

Sex work is an expansive field that includes individuals with varying skill sets and from across the socioeconomic spectrum. Bromwich & Dejong explain that sex work “has not always been lived in similar material conditions … [and] has not been thought about the same way in all places and times, … [creating] muddiness around the edges of the category of what constitutes and who is a sex worker.” In fact, there are debates within the sex worker community about what counts as sex work. I recently had an informal conversation with a woman who considered herself a sex worker, buy had been excluded from a particular support group for sex workers because her work, which took place exclusively online, was not considered to be sex work by the organizer. Despite debates and its diversity, it appears that most sex work that takes place today in Canada can be classified as either indoor sex work or outdoor (street-based) sex work.

Street-based sex workers solicit clients from outdoor locations such as street corners, alleys, and parks and is considered to be one of the most dangerous type of sex work. While most people may conjure images of street workers when thinking about sex workers, many studies suggest that only twenty percent or less of all sex work is street-based.

Indoor sex work can be classified as formal or informal. Formal indoor sex work occurs in formal sex work establishments, such as erotic massage parlours, strip clubs, burlesque, micro-brothels, professional

50 Bromwich & DeJong, supra note 8 at 5.
51 Ibid at 5; Maggie’s, supra note 49 at 222.
53 Bromwich & DeJong, supra note 8 at 5.
54 Ibid at 5.
57 Satabdi Samtani & Elizabeth Trejos-Castillo, “Motherhood and Sex Work: A negotiation of identities” in Bromwich & DeJong, supra note 8 at 278; Rochelle L Dalla (2003), ibid at 216.
escort services, pornography studios, and other in-call locations.\textsuperscript{58} Informal indoor sex work takes place in bars, saunas, and hotels open to the general public. Sugar babies, often young university students who are linked with adult partners (called Sugar Daddies or Sugar Mommies) who pay for tuition and other costs in exchange for dates would likely be classified as engaging in informal indoor sex work.\textsuperscript{59} Some sex workers provide services exclusively online, such as through camming or other online chat services.\textsuperscript{60}

Many indoor sex workers, such as exotic dancers and cam girls, provide services of a sexual nature that would not likely be caught within the prostitution provisions of the \textit{Criminal Code}.\textsuperscript{61} Such sex workers are nevertheless relevant to my research, as I am interested in the impact of stigma—including social stigma—against sex workers in Family Law and Child Protection courts. The scope of my work is not limited to impacts arising out of criminal prostitution charges or convictions.

\textbf{Stigma}

Almost all of the sex worker literature that I encountered discussed stigma. Feminist scholar Sara Ruddick explains that a person engages in stigmatization when they exclude someone from their designation of a standard human.\textsuperscript{62} Nancy Scheper-Hughes describes stigma as an “undesired difference” that “makes us turn away from another human being in fear, disgust, anger, pity, or loathing.” \textsuperscript{63} She argues that stigmatizing “is the most anti-social of human acts, for it consigns the victim to a living death on the margins of human interaction.”\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{58} Duff \textit{et al} (2014), \textit{supra} note 47 at 2.
\textsuperscript{59} Bromwich & DeJong, \textit{supra} note 8 at 6.
\textsuperscript{60} PJ Starr \textit{et al}, “Red Umbrella Babies: By Sex Worker Parents and Their Children” in Bromwich & DeJong, \textit{supra} note 8 at 148-149.
\textsuperscript{61} While the \textit{Criminal Code}, \textit{supra} note 1, does not contain a prescribed definition of “sexual services”, it appears that the prostitution provisions are generally understood to apply to the purchase and sale of sexual intercourse, oral sex, and manual sex.
\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Ibid}. 
Sex workers encounter high levels of stigma. Author and activist Cheryl Auger argues that sex workers are constructed as “deviant, health or moral threats, or passive victims,” cast aside by family members, policy makers, and authorities. Bruckert & Hannem assert that stigma-based assumptions about sex workers are “embedded in social structures and subsequently reflected in institutional policy and practice,” leading sex workers to often suffer verbal abuse, public shaming, over policing, and violence. The fact that crimes against sex workers—including harassment, rape, assault, and murder—go uninvestigated at a much higher rate than many other members of society is just one example of the extent to which sex workers are marginalized.

Lewis, Shaver, & Maticka-Tyndal argue that sex work and sex workers are cast as inherently harmful to society because they are viewed as “immoral and offensive and therefore threatening to moral order and the stability of Canadian society”. This harm-based view of sex work, including the view that sex work is inherently harmful to children, is perpetuated by Parliament. One of the objectives of Bill C-36 is to “[p]rotect communities, and especially children, from the harms caused by prostitution”. Penalties for violating the prostitution laws may be more severe if the offense is committed in a “public place that is or is next to parks, schools, religious institutions or places where children can reasonably be expected to be present.”

Lewis, Shaver, & Maticka-Tyndal go on explain that “[u]nder the guise of protecting the family, women, children, neighbourhoods, the good of society, and even sex workers themselves, we are told it is necessary to maintain a prohibition on sex-work-related activities.” They argue that, rather than relying

65 For example, see Jacqueline Lewis, Frances M Shaver, & Eleanor Maticka-Tyndale, “Going ‘round Against: The Persistence of Prostitution-Related Stigma” in Chapter 13 of van der Meulen, Durisin, & Love., supra note 6 at 198. Lebovitch & Ferris, supra note 35 at 19 and generally; Lisa Lazarus et al, “Occupational Stigma as a Primary Barrier to Health Care for Street-Based Sex Workers in Canada” (2012) 14:2 Culture, Health & Sexuality 139.
66 Michael Goodyear & Cheryl Auger, “Regulating Women’s Sexuality: Social Movements and Internal Exclusion” in Chapter 14 of van der Meulen, Durisin, & Love, ibid at 213.
68 Ibid.
69 Maggie’s, in Lebovitch & Ferris, supra note 35 at 228-231; SWAUV Board members, “Chapter 3: ‘Pick the time and get some women together’: Organizing as the Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society” in Lebovitch & Ferris, supra note 35 at 62-63.
70 Lewis, Shaver, & Maticka-Tyndal, supra note 65 at 202.
71 Canada, Department of Justice, supra note 31.
72 Ibid.
73 Lewis, Shaver, & Maticka-Tyndal, supra note 65 at 203.
on stigma and “morality-based discourse[s] of harm” to “justify and perpetuate the divisions between ‘decent folks’ and ‘prostitutes’ ... it is imperative that the government commit to basing law and policy on empirical evidence, taking a social justice stance toward the sex industry, and actively promoting the development of a more evidence-based understanding of the people who work in it.”

In this work, I argue that the “evidence-based understanding” of sex work advocated for by Lewis, Shaver, & Maticka-Tyndal—as opposed to a stigma-based understanding—ought to be applied to sex worker parents in Child Protection and Family Law courtrooms.

**Sex worker parents**

Stigma against sex worker parents can have unique impacts on their legal rights as parents and their relationships with their children. In the balance of this chapter, I review the literature that illustrates the lives of sex worker parents and the impact of stigma on their identities and their children.

A note on gender

There is an unavoidable gendered aspect to this field. Research shows that the majority of sex workers are women and most sex worker parents are mothers. However, in my research I came across cases and stories involving sex workers of various genders. I thus in general refer to sex worker parents and parenthood as opposed to mothers and motherhood.

---

74 *Ibid* at 205.
75 *Ibid*.
76 PJ Starr *et al*, *supra* note 60 at 147.
77 Bromwich & Dejong, *ibid*.
78 For example, the sex worker parent in 2013 ONCJ 399 [HP] was a transwoman.
79 PJ Starr *et al*, *supra* note 60 at 149; Redwood River, “Myths and Realities of Male Sex Work: A Personal Perspective” in van der Meulen, Durisim, & Love, *supra* note 6 at 45.
Sex work and parenting, particularly in North America, is a budding field of study. As recently as 2018 Dr. Susan Dewey of Wyoming commented on the lack of studies exploring the concept of parenthood among sex workers, and even fewer focusing on child loss.\textsuperscript{80}

As the field emerges, however, so do certain trends. First, many sex workers are mothers.\textsuperscript{81} Sloss et al estimated that 80-90\% of sex workers in the United States had given birth to at least one child.\textsuperscript{82} Most embrace parenthood and want to be “good mothers”, or good parents, to their children.\textsuperscript{83} In general, sex workers with children “continue to see themselves as mothers when authority figures, family members, and socioinstitutional systems do not.”\textsuperscript{84}

Second, sex worker parents encounter high levels of social and state scrutiny.\textsuperscript{85} According to Susan Dewey, sex worker parents are often “sociolegally and morally position[ed] ... as fundamentally risky subjects who pose a danger to their children”\textsuperscript{86}. Samtani & Trejos-Castillo explain that “societal disapproval of sex work as a profession overshadows a mother’s parental role, without actually giving a sex worker mom the fair chance to be evaluated on the merits of her motherhood.”\textsuperscript{87} As such, “sex work as a profession and mothering stand juxtaposed”.\textsuperscript{88}

Indeed, many sex worker parents describe living in constant fear of Child Protection services and for good cause.\textsuperscript{89} A third trend emerging from the research is that sex worker parents experience

\textsuperscript{80} Dewey, \textit{supra} note 11.
\textsuperscript{81} Bromwich & Dejong, \textit{supra} note 8 at 14.
\textsuperscript{84} Dewey, \textit{supra} note 11 at 30.
\textsuperscript{85} PJ Starr \textit{et al}, \textit{supra} note 60 at 149.
\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Ibid} at 28.
\textsuperscript{87} Samtani & Trejos-Castillo, \textit{supra} note 57 at 276.
\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Ibid} at 278.
\textsuperscript{89} Anonymous, “Mama Tiger Rising” in Bromwich & Dejong, \textit{supra} note 8 at 272.
disproportionately high levels of child apprehension. In one 2014 study by Duff, over one third of 350 sex worker parents interviewed reported having a child apprehended by Child Protection services. In a study conducted by Rochelle Dalla involving the children of thirty-eight sex worker mothers, only ten of 105 children remained with their biological mothers. Of those remaining ten children, all had been involved in multiple society-initiated cases.

Fourth, while all sex workers face increased risk of child apprehension in comparison to the general population, street-based sex workers experience higher odds—according to Duff, up to a 2.5-fold increase—of child apprehension compared to indoor sex workers. The high rates of apprehension among street-based sex workers parents appears to correlate with “multiple and intersecting marginalizations” that can contribute to the “ongoing battle[s] to keep their children”. Across North America, nearly all street-based parents experience one or more of the following social, economic, or health barriers to parenting:

1. Substance abuse;
2. Domestic violence;
3. Poverty/homelessness, and/or

91 Duff et al (2014), supra note 47.
94 Ibid at 1.
95 Dewey et al, supra note 11.
97 In Duff et al (2015), supra note 10 at 1048, 88% street-based sex workers interviewed reported being homeless at some point in their lives. Kenny, supra note 90, describes how street-based sex workers may have limited family supports due to increased presence of intergenerational poverty among street-based sex workers.
4. Compromised mental health.\(^{98}\)

I struggled with my decision to adopt the term “domestic violence” as opposed to violence against women. I am aware of the dangers of removing the gendered aspect of domestic violence, given that the majority of violence that takes place in homes involves violence against women. I also recognize that many female sex workers experience violence at the hands of male pimps, clients, and partners.\(^{99}\) However, many of the cases I encountered in my research involved violence by and against persons of multiple genders. I thus believe that, for the purpose of this research, it would be inaccurate to suggest that domestic violence only included violence against women.

I refer to the above four barriers to parenting—substance abuse, domestic violence, poverty and homelessness, and compromised mental health—as “shared precarities”, a term coined by Dewey et al.\(^{100}\) While social services and support are available to sex workers to assist with these shared precarities, many fear the possible repercussions of accessing those resources.\(^{101}\) Sex workers report “huge discrimination in both health and social services needs”\(^{102}\) and many are fearful about being open about their work with service providers due to the risk of outing themselves as a sex worker and losing custody of a child.\(^{103}\)

We know less about the parenting experiences of indoor sex workers. The limited resources suggest that, in general, indoor sex workers lead higher quality lives and face lower levels of victimization than outdoor workers.\(^{104}\) While indoor workers may experience shared precarities (as might any parent), many stories,

\(^{98}\) Regarding mental health, the studies that I reviewed for this research commonly referred to post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorders, personality disorders, or schizophrenia. For my purposes (discussed further in Chapter 2: Methodology), I identified cases where compromised mental health was deemed to be significant enough to be relevant to the proceeding. This included sex worker parents who experienced depression, anxiety disorders, personality disorders, or, in some cases, where a court simply referred to the impact of the sex worker parent’s mental health on their parenting abilities.


\(^{100}\) Dewey et al, supra note 11.


\(^{102}\) Samtani & Trejos-Castillo, supra note 57 at 278.

\(^{103}\) Sloss & Harper, supra note 82 at 111-112

\(^{104}\) Tamara O’Doherty, “Victimization in Off-Street Sex Industry Work” (June 2011) 17:7 Violence Against Women 944.
blog posts, anthologies, and publications from indoor sex workers describe lives free from such hardships.105 Granger-Brown et al explain that indoor sex workers may come from more “traditionally accepted forms of motherhood, such as that of a girlfriend or middle-class wife.”106 They are more likely to earn high incomes and live in safe neighbourhoods. Many indoor sex worker parents believe that their work provides them with the means to be good parents.107 As documented by Benoit et al, many sex workers reported low or flexible hours, and, in comparison to white-collar women workers, reported higher levels of income, and job satisfaction, job security, and “skill discretion” (or the freedom to determine which skills to use).108

Despite parenting advantages, indoor sex worker parents remain at risk of having their parenting capabilities scrutinized due to their careers.109 Many describe courtroom battles where former partners use their involvement with sex work to argue—sometimes successfully—that they are unfit parents.110 Juliana Piccillo, a prominent sex worker activist, stated that “every sex worker I know who's a parent and has gone through a divorce or separation has had their ex try to use [sex work] to take the kids away.”111

---

105 See generally Bromwich & DeJong, supra note 8; Red Umbrella Babies, supra note 7.
106 Granger-Brown et al, supra note 96 at 40.
Moving forward

Research tells us that sex worker parents are numerous, stigmatized, scrutinized by authorities, and that they often lose legal custody of their children. For street-based sex workers, we also know that the presence of one or more shared precarities likely contributes to their challenges in battles for custody. Most of this information comes from sociological studies on sex workers and child loss, with data obtained from interviews with sex worker parents. Despite the legal nature of the subject matter, there do not appear to be any studies or analyses on the specific legal issues that sex workers face in courtroom proceedings regarding custody and access of their children, or how evidence regarding parental involvement in sex work has been applied by judges in custody and access disputes. In this work, I begin exploring the legal impact of evidence regarding parental engagement in sex work on custody and access disputes in Child Protection and Family Law proceedings Ontario.
Chapter 2: Methodology

Doctrinal legal research and analysis

I answered my research question through doctrinal legal research. Doctrine is described by Edward Rubin as an “inherently normative activity”. I took a descriptive approach, focusing on the interpretation of the primary law and, where relevant, underlying policy. The purpose of this work was to provide a positivist piece that identifies the impact of a parent’s status as a sex worker on custody and access decisions.

As noted in Chapter 1, many actions related to sex work are criminalized. To begin, I thus confirmed the legal status of sex work in Canada by reviewing the following:

- *Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford*;
- Pertinent provisions of the *Criminal Code* regarding prostitution, and
- Government, academic, and lay publications on the legal status of sex work in Canada.

Second, I searched for resources and literature discussing sex workers and parenting. I used keyword searches (including sex work*, prostitut*, parent*, mother*, child*) at public library (Toronto Public Library database) and online academic databases (Google Scholar, Heinonline, York University Library, LegalTrac, Scholar’s Portal). I found little legal scholarship discussing the impact of a parent’s status as a sex worker on custody and access decisions in both in the Family Law and Child Protection fields. As such, I broadened my search to include sociological and sociolegal sources. I ultimately collected a small body of research on the intersections between sex work and parenting, some of which commented on experiences with Child Protection agencies and rates of child apprehension. Still, I did not locate any legal analyses on point.

---

114 *Bedford*, supra note 1.
115 *Criminal Code*, supra note 1.
Third, I identified the applicable Family Law and Child Protection legislative frameworks. I reviewed treatises and textbooks on Family Law and Child Protection Law in Ontario, focusing on chapters about custody and access, the “best interests” factors, and past conduct of a parent. Family Law proceedings in Ontario are governed by the CLRA and the Federal Divorce Act. Part III of the CLRA and section 16 of the Divorce Act pertain to custody and access orders. Child Protection proceedings are currently governed by Part V of the Ontario CYFSA, 2017, but, prior to June 2018, were governed by Part III of the CFSA. I reviewed official versions of each statute to confirm currency dates. I consulted annotated versions of the above legislation to obtain a general sense of how the provisions I intend to focus on have been interpreted and applied by the Courts, making note of any case law mentioned in the annotations that appeared relevant.

Fourth, I compiled a list of all relevant Family Law and Child Protection case law decided under the four legislative schemes. In order to be relevant to this research, a decision must have been decided in Ontario between January 1, 2010 to March 2020; one of the issues in dispute must relate to custody of or access to a child; and the decision must indicate that one or more parents involved in the proceeding was engaged in sex work prior to or at time of trial. Determining whether a parent engaged in sex work as defined in this work required certain assumptions. As noted in Chapter 1, sex work is “the voluntary exchange of sexual services for money” and does not necessarily include all acts of prostitution. However, many parents were simply described as prostitutes in the case law. For the purpose of exploring judicial treatment of sex work, I assumed that a parent described as a prostitute or a sex trade worker engaged in voluntary sex work unless it was clear from a decision that a parent was a victim of human trafficking or otherwise engaged only in the involuntary exchange of sexual services for money.

I started by reviewing and noting up the case law that I identified when reviewing the annotated legislation. I then noted up Part III of the CFSA, Part V of the CYFSA, 2017, section 16 of the Divorce Act, and the totality of the CLRA using three legal databases: Westlaw, Canlii, and LexisNexis. While Part III of

---

116 McCarney, supra note 113 at 10:5-10:12.
117 CLRA, supra note 4; Divorce Act, supra note 4.
118 CYFSA, 2017, supra note 4; CFSA, supra note 4.
119 E-laws currency date for CLRA, supra note 4, CFSA, ibid, and CYFSA, 2017, ibid: November 29, 2019; Justice Laws Website currency date for Divorce Act, supra note 4, November 19, 2019.
120 McCarney, supra note 113 at 10:13.
121 Bromwich & DeLong, supra note 8 at 5.
the CLRA pertains to custody and access, Part I discusses parentage and definitions that I believed might lead to relevant decisions. Out of an abundance of caution, I did not limit my searches under the CLRA to Part III. I used advanced (Boolean) search options to filter for decisions that included at least one of following keywords:

- Sex work*, sex-work* (captures sex worker and sex-worker)
- Prostitut* (captures prostitute, prostitution, prostituting, prostituted)
- sex traffick* and sex-traffick* (captures sex trafficking and sex-trafficking)
- Sexual services
- Exotic
- exotic dance* (captures exotic dancer)
- strip* (captures stripper, stripping, strip club)
- massage, massage parlor, and massage parlour
- Escort*
- Brothel
- Bawdy-house
- In-call
- Cam girl
- Porno* (captures pornography)
- Porn, porn star
- hooker
- whore
- drag

I skimmed the facts of each decision to determine whether, on its face, the proceeding appeared to involve a sex worker parent and relate to a claim for custody and access to, or the care and control of, a child. In Child Protection cases, issues related to the custody and access or the care and control of children can arise during society investigations; apprehension; temporary care hearings; determinations that a child is in need of protection (and thus state interference with custody is warranted); and orders for crown warship, permanent society care, society wardship, interim society care, and/or adoption (discussed in more detail in Chapter 3). I discarded decisions that did not fit these criteria. I created a short-list of twenty Family Law cases and thirty-two Child Protection cases. I organized the final list of decisions chronologically.

Finally, I performed a careful review of the short-listed decisions and sorted them into two categories: cases of actual sex work to be coded and cases involving only allegations of sex work. I coded eight Family Law cases and nineteen Child Protection cases where parental involvement in sex work was either
admitted by the sex worker parent or was otherwise accepted into evidence by the court. I created a list of—but did not code—cases where parental involvement in sex work was simply alleged by a third party, but not otherwise accepted or incorporated into the court’s analysis, or “allegation cases”. Allegation cases are evidence of the societal view that sex work is incompatible with parenting, but do not assist with my analysis of the impact of parental engagement of sex work on judicial decision-making. Twelve of the twenty Family Law cases were allegation cases and fourteen of the thirty-two Child Protection decisions were allegation cases.

For the substantive (i.e., non-allegation) cases, I recorded the following information in coding tables that I created on Microsoft word:\textsuperscript{122}

- Citation;
- Date of hearing and date of judgment;
- Name of Judge;
- Issues and ruling. For Child Protection cases, I noted the relief sought by the moving party; the grounds for finding that a child was in need of protection; orders rendered; and any other relevant issue before the court. For Family Law cases, I noted the relief sought (custody and/or access);
- The Act that the decision was brought and decided under;
- Information regarding the parties and children. In Child Protection cases, I noted the name of the Applicant Child Protection society; the respondents’ name, gender, and sex work status (if any) as described by the court; and the name, gender, and age\textsuperscript{123} of the children that were the subject of the proceeding and, where relevant, any other children discussed in the decision that were not the subject of the proceeding. For both parents and children, I included a column for “other” information that may be informative, such as race or relationship to the child if the respondent was not a parent. In Family Law cases, I noted the name, gender, and sex work status (if any) as described by the court for the parties; and the name, gender, and age of the children that were the subject of the proceeding and, where relevant, any other children discussed in the decision that were not the subject of the proceeding. I again included a column for “other” information;

\textsuperscript{122} See Coding tables at Appendix A.

\textsuperscript{123} Interestingly, courts did not comment on the age of the child when discussing the parent’s involvement in sex work. I mention the child’s age in certain summaries of the cases in Chapter 3 and 4 for context, but do not incorporate the children’s ages into my discussion in Chapter 5.
A brief of the decision. Briefs included colour-coding excerpts of all references to the parent’s involvement in sex work; applications of sex work to an aspect of the courts’ ruling; and references to shared precarities;

My comments and observations; and

Noting-up results.

In order to better identify trends in judicial decision making within the nineteen Child Protection decisions, I created a simple excel spreadsheet pulling out the following data regarding the sex worker parent:

- Citation;
- Past or current parental involvement in sex work;
- Short summary of the court’s description of the sex work;
- Involvement of the sex worker parent in the hearing. I noted whether the parent was actively involved in the proceeding at time of hearing (i.e., still a party, filed some materials at some point) and seeking custody and/or access to at least one child involved; in default; did not participate but not noted in default; or had abandoned the proceeding;
- Any racial or cultural information regarding the parent;
- The provision(s) under which the child(ren) were found to be in need of protection;
- Age(s) of the child(ren);
- References to shared precarities; and
- Custody and access outcomes (crown wardship; custody for the sex worker parent; other custody orders; no access; access).

All data was included in a single row on the spreadsheet, so I could count and view trends within the Child Protection decisions at a glance.

**Limitations and alternative methods**

There are limitations to my method. Many Family Law and Child Protection proceedings settle before a hearing, or if they do go to a hearing, go unreported. As such, doctrinal research only provides a limited picture of sex worker parents’ experiences in the courtroom.
I considered interviews and case file reviews as alternative methods. Such methods could generate richer data about individual cases than is available through doctrinal research. Interviews could tell the stories from the perspectives of the sex workers, as opposed to the judges. Transcripts could reveal the stories as presented by the sex workers’ lawyers, the sex workers themselves if they were self-represented, society lawyers, judges, and the evidence of any witnesses. Even so, it would have been significantly more time-consuming to conduct interviews and identify, locate, obtain, and review case files. Given that the Osgoode LLM program is one year in duration, I would only have been able to present data from a limited number of cases, whereas the method I adopted allowed me to explore a larger pool of data.
Chapter 3: Child Protection

Child Protection laws allow for government intervention with families in order to protect vulnerable children from harm. As described by the Ministry of the Attorney General, intervention by a Children’s Aid Society, which can range from a telephone investigation to apprehension of a child, may be warranted when “concerns are raised about a family's ability to care for a child.”\(^{124}\)

The state’s duty to protect children and unilateral right to intervene can have a considerable impact on the autonomy of parents and create an imbalance of power between the parties. Similar to Criminal Law matters, parents involved in Child Protection proceedings—who are often vulnerable members of society to begin with—have little-to-no control over the process. For example, proceedings under Criminal and Child Protection laws are often triggered by a report to a state actor (\(i.e.,\) the police or a Child Protection agency) by a third party. A preliminary investigation led by state authorities follows. Much like a crown prosecutor who elects to proceed with an indictment, a Children’s Aid Society can then elect to commence court proceedings. Like an accused who may voluntarily agree to a plea bargain, a parent may agree to enter into a voluntary care plan.\(^{125}\) The consequences of failing to take such “voluntary” steps are often the same: the matter, where one party’s \textit{Charter}-protected right to security of the person is at stake,\(^{126}\) proceeds towards trial.

In this chapter, I outline the provisions from Child Protection legislative schemes in Ontario that I noted up for this research; provide an overview of statistics arising from case law research; and analyse the impact that a parent’s status as a sex worker had at each step of the Child Protection legal process within the case law.

I conclude that sex work is generally treated as a negative quality in a parent, rather than as an aspect of a parent’s life that warrants further factual exploration. The case law suggests that courts rely more upon negative assumptions or stigma about sex work and sex workers than on evidence regarding the impact (if any) of a parent’s involvement in sex work upon their child in Child Protection hearings in Ontario.

\(^{125}\) CYFSA, 2017 \textit{supra} note 4, s 75(1).
\(^{126}\) \textit{New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G (J)}, [1999] 3 SCR 46, 1999 CanLII 653 (SCC).
Past and present Child Protection legislative schemes in Ontario: Comparison of the former Child and Family Services Act with the new Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017

I begin this chapter by providing and explaining the relevant legislation schemes. Child protection proceedings in Ontario are governed by Part V of the CYFSA, 2017. The CYFSA, 2017, however, only came into force on April 30, 2018. Most of the case law discussed in this chapter was decided under the now-repealed CFSA.

The Child Protection processes provided under the CFSA and CYFSA, 2017 (“the Child Protection Acts”) are substantively and procedurally similar. Both contain comparable:

1. paramount purposes;
2. triggers for commencing of proceedings;
3. temporary care hearings during adjournments;
4. elements of Child Protection hearings and available orders;
5. factors that a court must consider when making an order in the best interests of a child; and
6. limitations on the admissibility of evidence regarding a parent’s past conduct.

As such, I suspect that the case law regarding sex worker parents decided under the CFSA discussed in section c) of this chapter will remain applicable under the new legislation.

The paramount purpose of both Acts is to promote the best interests of children.

The Child Protection Acts focus on the best interests of the child. The paramount purpose guiding the interpretation and application each Act is to “promote the best interests, protection and well-being of children” and, discussed further below, prescribe mandatory considerations for courts when making an order in the best interests of a child.

128 For a side-by-side comparison of the provisions of the CFSA, supra note 4 the CYFSA, 2017, ibid, discussed in this Chapter, see Appendix B.
129 CFSA, ibid, s 1(1); CYFSA, 2017 ibid, s 1(1).
130 CFSA, ibid, s 37(3); CYFSA, 2017, ibid, s 74(3).
Proceedings under the Child Protection Acts are often triggered by third-party reports made to a children’s aid society. Subsections 72(1) of the CFSA and 125(1) of the CYFSA, 2017 impose a duty to report to a children’s aid society on any person who believes that a child is in need of protection.\textsuperscript{131} The person must have reasonable grounds to suspect that a child is at risk of or has actually suffered harm. “Harm” includes actual or risk of physical harm, emotional harm, sexual abuse, neglect; and/or failure to provide necessary treatment.\textsuperscript{132} Upon receipt of a report, a society must carry out a preliminary assessment or investigation of the family to assess and verify the report.\textsuperscript{133}

Temporary care hearings

Child Protection proceedings often have strict timelines that can only be extended with leave of the Court. For example, s. 88(1) of the CYFSA, 2017 states that a Child Protection hearing must proceed within five days of apprehension.\textsuperscript{134} Parties are often unable to meet such timelines for various reasons and so may request an adjournment before the matter can proceed to trial. If the Court grants an adjournment, the Court shall also make an order for the temporary care and custody of the child during the adjournment period.\textsuperscript{135}

The options for custody of a child during an adjournment are the same under both of the Child Protection Acts. The Court may order that the child remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention (with or without supervision and reasonable terms and conditions); be placed, on consent, in the care and custody of a person other than the person referred to above, subject to society supervision and on reasonable terms and conditions; or remain or be placed in the care of the society.\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{132} CFSA, \textit{ibid}, s 72(1); CYFSA, 2017, \textit{ibid}, s 125(1).
\textsuperscript{133} CFSA, \textit{ibid}, s 72(3); CYFSA, 2017, \textit{ibid}, s 126(1).
\textsuperscript{134} CYFSA, 2017, \textit{ibid}.
\textsuperscript{135} CFSA, \textit{supra} note 4, s 52(1); CYFSA, 2017, \textit{ibid}, s 94(2).
\textsuperscript{136} CFSA, \textit{ibid}, s 51(2); CYFSA, 2017, \textit{ibid}, s 94(2).
The Child Protection Acts both provide that a child shall not be placed in the care and custody of the society or another person, unless the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer harm if returned to the person who had care and control prior to apprehension, and that the child cannot be protected adequately by an order for society supervision and on such reasonable terms and conditions that the Court considers appropriate.\(^\text{137}\)

The Child Protection hearing

Once a society has decided to intervene, the society may commence an application with the Court to determine whether a child is in need of protection.\(^\text{138}\) At a Child Protection hearing, the society must establish that the child is in need of protection and that intervention through a court order is necessary to protect the child in the future.\(^\text{139}\) Any order made must be in the child’s best interests.

First, a society must establish that a child is in need of protection

Circumstances and conditions under which a child will be deemed to be in need of protection are provided in subsection 37(2) of the CFSA and subsection 74(2) of the CYFSA, 2017.\(^\text{140}\) There are no substantive differences between the grounds for finding that a child is in need of protection between the Child Protection Acts. In summary, under both Child Protection Acts, a child is in need of protection where:

- the child has suffered, or there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer, physical harm or emotional harm, either inflicted by the parent or resulting from the parent’s failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child, or a pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child;
- the child has been or is likely to be sexually abused or sexually exploited, by the parent or another person where the parent knew or ought to have known and fails to protect the child;

\(^{137}\) CFSA, ibid, s 51(3); CYFSA, 2017, ibid, s 94(4).
\(^{138}\) CFSA, ibid, s 40(1); CYFSA, 2017, ibid, s 81(1), 90(1). The matter may not necessarily result in a Child Protection hearing. As noted in s. 88(a)-(e) of the CYFSA, 2017, other options include returning the child to the parent or any other person with custody of the child, entering into a voluntary temporary care agreement.
\(^{139}\) CYFSA, 2017, ibid, s 101(1).
\(^{140}\) CFSA, supra note 4; CYFSA, 2017, ibid.
• the child requires or there is a risk that the child will require treatment for physical harm or suffering, emotional harm and the parent does not provide or refuses to consent to necessary treatment;

• the child suffers from a mental, emotional, or developmental condition that, if not remedied, could seriously impair the child’s development and the parent does not provide or refuses to consent to necessary treatment;

• the child has been abandoned, the child’s parent has died or is unavailable to exercise custodial rights over the child and has not made adequate provision for the child’s care and custody, or the parent refuses to, is unable, or unwilling to resume the child’s care and custody;

• the child is younger than 12 and has killed or seriously injured another person, or caused seriously damage to another person’s property, and the parent refuses to provide or consent to services or treatment necessary to prevent a recurrence;

• the child is younger than 12 and has on more than one occasion injured another person or caused property damage with the encouragement of the parent or because of a failure to supervise; and/or

• the parent is unable to care for the child and consents to court assistance.141

Second, the society must establish that a court order is necessary to protect the child moving forward.

If a society establishes that a child is in need of protection, they must then demonstrate that intervention by a court order is necessary to protect the child in the future.142 The terms of the Court order must address the specific category of harm that led to the finding that the child is in need of protection.

The terminology used for protection orders is one area where the Child Protection Acts differ. Under the CFSA, the following protection orders were available to the Court:

141 Ibid.
142 CFSA, ibid, s 57(1); CYFSA, 2017, ibid, s 101(1).
1. **Supervision order**: That the child be placed in the care and custody of a parent or another person, subject to the supervision of the society, for a specified period of at least three months and not more than 12 months.

2. **Society wardship**: That the child be made a ward of the society and be placed in its care and custody for a specified period not exceeding twelve months.

3. **Crown wardship**: That the child be made a ward of the Crown, until the wardship is terminated under section 65.2 or expires under subsection 71(1) and be placed in the care of the society.

4. **Consecutive orders of society wardship and supervision**: That the child be made a ward of the society under paragraph 2 for a specified period and then be returned to a parent or another person under paragraph 1, for a period or periods not exceeding an aggregate of twelve months.\(^\text{143}\)

While the orders available under the *CYFSA, 2017* are effectively the same, the legislature replaced the terms “society wardship” and “crown wardship” with “interim society care” and “extended society care”. The following protection orders, from least to most disruptive, are now available to the Court under s. 101(1) of the *CYFSA, 2017*:

1. **Supervision order**: That the child be placed in the care and custody of a parent or another person, subject to the supervision of the society, for a specified period of at least three months and not more than 12 months (including any reasonable terms and conditions that the Court deems necessary).

2. **Interim society care**: That the child be placed in interim society care and custody for a specified period not exceeding 12 months.

3. **Extended society care**: That the child be placed in extended society care until the order is terminated or expires.

4. **Consecutive orders of interim society care and supervision**: That the child be placed in interim society care and custody under paragraph 2 for a specified period and then be returned to a parent or another person under paragraph 1, for a period or periods not exceeding a total of 12 months.\(^\text{144}\)

\(^{143}\) *CFSA, ibid.*  
\(^{144}\) *CYFSA, 2017, supra* note 4.
Alternatively, the Child Protection Acts provide courts with the jurisdiction to make an order granting custody of a child to a person other than a foster parent if such an order is in the child’s best interests.\textsuperscript{145}

Both Child Protection Acts state that a court shall \textbf{not} make an order removing the child from the care of the person who had charge immediately before intervention unless the Court is satisfied that any less disruptive options are inadequate to protect the child.\textsuperscript{146}

\textit{Courts may make orders for access}

In addition to a protection order or a custody order, a judge presiding over a Child Protection proceeding may also make, vary, or terminate an access order.\textsuperscript{147} The test for access to a child that has been made a Crown Ward/placed in extended society care reflects another substantive difference between the Child Protection Acts. Satisfying the test for access to a Crown Ward under the CFSA was described by Justice Kukurin of the ONCJ as a “formidable” or “almost impossible” task.\textsuperscript{148} The CFSA provided that a court shall not make or vary an access order made with respect to a child who has been made a crown ward unless the Court is satisfied that:

\begin{itemize}
\item[(a)] the relationship between the person and the child is beneficial and meaningful to the child;
\item[] and
\item[(b)] the ordered access will not impair the child’s future opportunities for adoption.\textsuperscript{149}
\end{itemize}

In contrast, under the CYFSA, 2017, the presumption against access for children in extended society care has been removed.\textsuperscript{150} Now, a court need only find that access would be in the child’s best interests.\textsuperscript{151} When considering whether access is in the best interests of the child, courts shall continue to consider whether the relationship between the parent and the child is beneficial and meaningful to the child and whether access will impair the child’s future opportunities for adoption, but there is no longer a burden

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[145] CFSA, supra note 4, s 57.1(1); CYFSA, 2017, ibid, s 102.
\item[146] CFSA, ibid, s 57(3); CYFSA, 2017, ibid, s 101(3).
\item[147] CFSA, ibid, 58(1); CYFSA, 2017, ibid, s 104, 105.
\item[148] Children’s Aid Society of the Districts of Sudbury and Manitoulin v CH, 2018 ONCJ 453 at para 15.
\item[149] CFSA, ibid, s 59(2.1)
\item[151] CYFSA, 2017, supra note 4, s 105(5).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
on the parent seeking access to establish same.\textsuperscript{152} Indeed, as the Court of Appeal recently explained in \textit{MW}, under the new regime even a parent who puts forward no evidence may still gain access to a child placed in extended society care.\textsuperscript{153}

\textbf{Any custody or access order must be in the best interests of the child}

Any time that a court renders a protection, custody, or access order under one of the Child Protection Acts, the order must be made in the child’s best interests. While courts are granted broad discretion to consider any circumstance of the case that the Court deems relevant, the Child Protection Acts both contain inexhaustive lists of considerations that the Courts must consider when rendering an order in the child’s best interests. Under the \textit{CFSA}, courts were required to consider:

\begin{enumerate}
\item The child’s physical, mental and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to meet those needs.
\item The child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development.
\item The child’s cultural background.
\item The religious faith, if any, in which the child is being raised.
\item The importance for the child’s development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family.
\item The child’s relationships and emotional ties to a parent, sibling, relative, other member of the child’s extended family or member of the child’s community.
\item The importance of continuity in the child’s care and the possible effect on the child of disruption of that continuity.
\item The merits of a plan for the child’s care proposed by a society, including a proposal that the child be placed for adoption or adopted, compared with the merits of the child remaining with or returning to a parent.
\item The child’s views and wishes, if they can be reasonably ascertained.
\item The effects on the child of delay in the disposition of the case.
\end{enumerate}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Ibid}, s 105(6). See also: \textit{MW, supra} note 150 at para 49. The shift in the approach to access for children in extended society care was recently summarized in \textit{Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v JG}, 2020 ONSC 1135 at paras 41-44. \textsuperscript{153} \textit{MW, ibid} at para 49.
\end{flushright}
11. The risk that the child may suffer harm through being removed from, kept away from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent.

12. The degree of risk, if any, that justified the finding that the child is in need of protection.

13. Any other relevant circumstance.\textsuperscript{154}

Section 37(4) of the \textit{CFSA} provides that when the Court makes “an order or determination in the best interests of a child and the child is an Indian or native person, the person shall take into consideration the importance, in recognition of the uniqueness of Indian and native culture, heritage and traditions, of preserving the child’s cultural identity.”\textsuperscript{155}

The definition of best interests under the \textit{CYFSA, 2017} is similar to the \textit{CFSA}. Now, courts must consider:

(a) the child’s views and wishes, given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity;\textsuperscript{156}

(b) in the case of a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child, the consider the importance of preserving the child’s cultural identity and connection to the community;\textsuperscript{157} and

(c) consider any other circumstance of the case that the person considers relevant, including:

(i) the child’s physical, mental, and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to meet those needs,

(ii) the child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development,

(iii) the child’s race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, family diversity, disability, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression,

(iv) the child’s cultural and linguistic heritage,

(v) the importance for the child’s development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family,

\textsuperscript{154} \textit{CFSA, supra} note 4, s 37(3).

\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Ibid}, s 37(4).

\textsuperscript{156} \textit{CYFSA, 2017, supra} note 4, s 74(3)(a).

\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Ibid}, s 74(3)(b).
(vi) the child’s relationships and emotional ties to a parent, sibling, relative, other member of the child’s extended family or member of the child’s community,
(vii) the importance of continuity in the child’s care and the possible effect on the child of disruption of that continuity,
(viii) the merits of a plan for the child’s care proposed by a society, including a proposal that the child be placed for adoption or adopted, compared with the merits of the child remaining with or returning to a parent,
(ix) the effects on the child of delay in the disposition of the case,
(x) the risk that the child may suffer harm through being removed from, kept away from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent, and
(xi) the degree of risk, if any, that justified the finding that the child is in need of protection.\(^{158}\)

For the purposes of this research, all of the relevant considerations regarding the best interests of a child under the CFSA that are referred to in the case law remain encoded in the CYFSA, 2017.

Admissibility of evidence regarding the past conduct of a parent

Both Child Protection Acts address the scope of evidence that is admissible during Child Protection hearings. Courts may consider the past conduct of a person toward any child if that person is or may care for or have access to the child that is the subject of the proceeding.\(^{159}\) Further, certain evidence from earlier civil or criminal proceedings is admissible. Courts may consider any relevant oral or written statement or report relevant to the Child Protection proceeding, including a transcript, exhibit or finding or the reasons for a decision in an earlier civil or criminal proceeding.\(^{160}\)

In the following section, I analyze the Child Protection case law interpreting and applying the above-noted elements of Child Protection proceedings in cases involving sex worker parents.

\(^{158}\) *Ibid*, s 74(3).
\(^{159}\) *CFSA*, *supra* note 4, s 50(1)(a); *CYFSA, 2017*, *ibid*, s 93(1)(a).
\(^{160}\) *CFSA, ibid*, s 50(1)(b); *CYFSA, 2017, ibid*, s 93(1)(b).
Overview of results

I located nineteen Child Protection decisions discussing custody and access of children of nineteen past or present sex workers under the Child Protection Acts. Of the nineteen sex worker parents discussed, eleven were former sex workers and eight were involved in sex work at the time of trial. Only one regained custody of their child. The nineteen decisions arose from eighteen proceedings, as two were appeals within the same court file. Still, the cases discuss nineteen sex worker parents as one decision involved the children of two fathers who were both former sex workers.

Below, I provide some of the quantitative information from the Child Protection case law. Because the purpose of this research is to identify the role of stigma for sex worker parents, I am limited in the conclusions that I can draw from numbers alone. We cannot draw on the words used to describe sex work, the weight given to sex work, or the impact of other factors—such as the shared precarities that were present in every case—on outcomes from numbers. Still, the numbers provide a startling snapshot and serve as a starting point for this story.

Most children were found to be in need of protection due to a risk of physical harm

Seventeen of decisions contained reasons for Child Protection hearings. All of the children that were the subject of those proceedings were found to be in need of protection (i.e., the court made a “finding”) under one or more of the following provisions:

- Thirteen findings that there was a risk that the child was likely to suffer physical harm inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child; or pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child;\(^{161}\)
- Three findings that the child’s parent was unable to care for the child and the child was brought before the Court with the parent’s consent;\(^{162}\)

\(^{161}\) *CFSA, ibid, s 37(2)(b)(i)-(ii)*
\(^{162}\) *Ibid, 37(2)(I).*
• Four findings that there was a risk that the child was likely to suffer emotional harm resulting from the actions, failure to act, or pattern of neglect on the part of the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child;\textsuperscript{163}

• One finding that the child suffered from a mental, emotional or developmental condition that, if not remedied, could seriously impair the child’s development and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide, or refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to, treatment to remedy or alleviate the condition;\textsuperscript{164}

• Two findings that the child had been abandoned;\textsuperscript{165} and

• Three cases where the ground for finding that the child was in need of protection was not noted.

Although not always apparent from written decisions, parties to Child Protection proceedings may agree to a finding that a child is in need of protection on consent in advance of a hearing. In the above seventeen cases, the Court explicitly noted in three decisions that the child was brought before the Court with the parent’s consent pursuant to s. 37(3)(l). The parties in the remaining fourteen decisions may have consented to the findings noted within. In any event, for the purpose of this research, the Court refers to parental involvement in sex work when discussing the finding that the child was in need of protection in only one case, discussed further below. In that case, the finding was reached on consent.

The most common protection order rendered was crown wardship, without access

Former sex worker parents were significantly more likely to be able to retain a relationship with their child than parents who were engaged in sex work current to the time of trial. Five of eleven (45.5%) former sex workers were granted custody or access. Only one of the eight (12.5%) current sex workers was granted access.

The following orders for custody and access were rendered for the eleven former sex worker parents:

• Five orders for crown wardship, without access for the purpose of adoption;

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid, s 37(2)(g).
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid, s 37(2)(h)
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid, s 37(2)(i).
• One order for crown wardship, with access to the parent (adoption was not an option for these children);
• One order placed the children in temporary society care, without access to the parent;
• One order placing the children in temporary society care, with access to the parent;
• Two orders placing the child(ren) in the care and custody of another parent, with access to the parent; and
• One order granted custody to the parent following a temporary care hearing.

In contrast, of the eight parents engaged in sex work at the time of hearing, one hundred percent of their children were made crown wards. The following orders for custody and access were rendered for the eight parents who were engaged in sex work at the time of trial:

• Seven orders for crown wardship, without access for the purpose of adoption; and
• One order for crown wardship, with access. In this case, the society did not submit a plan for adoption and so access could not impair the child’s prospects for adoption.

Case law analysis

In this section, I review and analyze case law where a parent’s involvement in sex work was considered by the Courts in relation to one of the following components of a Child Protection proceeding:

• triggering a proceeding;
• temporary care hearing during an adjournment;
• finding that a child is in need of protection; and
• determining that an order of the court, which must be made in the best interests of the child, is required to protect the child in the future.

I also note instances where courts refer to parental involvement in sex work to describe the parent and/or their lifestyle, but do not connect the sex work to a particular aspect of the legal analysis.
Many Child Protection proceedings involving sex workers are triggered by third-party complaints and concerns regarding the parent’s work.

Many Child Protection investigations and proceedings are triggered by accusations and allegations from third parties. For sex workers, their work is often a cause for societal investigation. In eight of the Child Protection cases, courts noted that at least one of the concerns leading to society investigation involved explicit allegations of sex work by a society worker or a third party. Not all decisions outlined the reasons for initial society involvement.

Third parties may be well-intentioned individuals who believe they are complying with their duty to report a suspicion that a child is at risk. However, many sex workers describe being reported to societies by vindictive former partners and disapproving family members.

I located an additional fourteen allegation cases where a report was made to a society that a parent was engaged in sex work and the allegation was used as grounds to investigate whether the child was at risk of harm. For example, in CCAS v. BLS, GKI, GJ SD the society became involved with the family due to concerns that the mother was “involved in prostitution.” Later, when the child was made a society ward, the society raised concerns with the mother’s “ongoing involvement with prostitution.” Justice Pazaratz did not engage in any analysis regarding the mother’s alleged involvement in sex work, nor did he explain what gave rise to the society’s concerns in this regard.

______________________________

166 Section 72(1) of the CFSA, *ibid*, provides that any person, including a person who performs professional or official duties with respect to children, who has reasonable grounds to suspect that a child has suffered, or is likely to suffer, physical harm, or has been or is likely to be sexually molested or exploited, the person shall forthwith report the suspicion and the information on which it is based to a society.
167 O’Hara, *supra* note 111.
168 *Native Child and Family Services of Toronto v DC*, 2010 ONSC 1038; *Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v RP*, 2010 ONSC 7106; *The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v CF*, 2011 ONSC 3335; *Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v CN*, 2013 ONSC 402; *Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v C-D*, 2014 ONSC 6954; *Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v KS*, 2015 ONCJ 63; *Children’s Aid Society v NJ-I*, 2016 ONSC 5889; *CAS of London and Middlesex v TY*, 2017 ONSC 3460; *Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v CN*, 2018 ONSC 3988; *Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v TTL*, 2018 ONCJ 403; *Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v TTL and SS*, 2019 ONCJ 530; *Children’s Aid Society of (Ottawa) v JR*, 2019 ONSC 3012; *CAS v TS and MOU and CS*, 2020 ONSC 879.
169 2014 ONSC 5513 [BLS].
170 *ibid* at para 10.
171 *ibid* at para 12.
Overcoming sex work supported one mother’s motion for custody at a hearing for temporary care and custody of the child during an adjournment

In many Child Protection cases a proceeding will be adjourned before the matter can proceed to a hearing for final disposition. If so, the Court will make a temporary order for care and custody of the child during the adjournment period.\(^{172}\)

The only Child Protection case where a sex worker parent received custody of a child was decided following a temporary care hearing. In *Children’s Aid Society of Algoma v RS*, the mother was a former stripper and escort.\(^{173}\) She successfully opposed a society motion to enter her child into society care at a temporary care hearing. It appears that her success can be partially attributed to the fact that she no longer engaged in sex work. Justice Kukurin began the decision by describing the mother’s life as “anything but stable”.\(^{174}\) He noted the mother’s past involvement in sex work while listing a number of unfavourable factors:

[The mother] has used both marijuana and cocaine in the past. She has been involved in domestic violence, as a perpetrator in the case of [a former partner] of whom she was convicted of assault. She has been employed as a stripper and as an escort.\(^{175}\)

Justice Kukurin then described how the “pejorative introduction [of the mother] must, in fairness, be juxtaposed to information ... that is more current.” In reviewing the mother’s positive qualities, he praised her for having “given up her job as a ‘dancer’ and ... attending school to upgrade herself to a high school diploma.”\(^{176}\) Justice Kukurin did not connect the mother’s sex work to an impact on the child.

---

\(^{172}\) *CFSA*, *supra* note 4, s 52(1).
\(^{173}\) 2013 ONCJ 688 [*RS*].
\(^{174}\) *Ibid* at paras 3-4.
\(^{175}\) *Ibid* at para 4.
\(^{176}\) *Ibid* at para 9.
Courts often find that the children of sex workers were in need of protection due to a risk of physical harm arising out neglect and/or failure to supervise.

In the majority of the cases where a court made a finding that a child was in need of protection, the Court found that the child was at risk of physical and/or emotional harm as a result of parental neglect and/or failure to supervise.

Sex work was only directly referred to by a court when justifying a finding that a child was in need of protection in one case. In Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo v CT, the mother’s involvement in sex work was included in a list of factors, including shared precarities, provided in the opening paragraphs of the decision to show that the child was at risk of physical harm. First, Justice Benotto noted that the father claimed that the mother was prostituting herself after describing the mother’s history with substance abuse:

[5] In 2006 the [Children’s Aid Society] received a referral from a public health nurse who learned that the mother was pregnant again. Shortly after the child’s birth, the mother tested positive for marijuana. A nurse observed the mother’s speech to be slurred. Although the child remained in her mother’s care, there were incidents of police involvement as a result of domestic violence reports. There were also ongoing reports to the Society about the mother’s alleged use of drugs in the presence of the child. A series of hair screens completed on the child in 2010 and 2011 showed positive results for cocaine and marijuana. In January 2012 the father told the Society that the mother was “prostituting herself.”

Second, Justice Benotto noted that the mother’s sex work was included in a Statement of Agreed Facts that the parties signed when agreeing that the child was in need of protection:

[6] In May 2012 the parents and the Society agreed that the child should be found in need of protection. The parents signed a Statement of Agreed Facts. The Statement outlined and summarized the background including the following:

i. From 2002 to 2012 there were ongoing issues regarding the parents’ drug usage;
ii. The mother was involved in the sex trade industry;
iii. There were incidents of domestic violence between the parents;

177 2017 ONCA 931 [CT].
178 Ibid.
iv. The mother had mental health issues including bipolar disorder and personality disorder;

v. The father was diagnosed with chronic pain, dysrhythmias, and panic disorder;

vi. Since February 2012, the father has had only supervised visits with the child and further access would be at the discretion of the Society; and

vii. The child is not an Indian or native person.\textsuperscript{179}

These passages highlight the fact that the society took the position that the mother’s sex work, as a stand-alone factor, placed the child at risk of physical harm. However, Justice Benotto did not explain how the society came to the conclusion that the mother’s involvement in sex work affected the child.

\textit{Courts have referred to parental engagement in sex work when considering what order is in the best interests of the child}.

For seven of the sex worker parents discussed in the Child Protection case law, the Court referred to past or present involvement in sex work when explaining what protection order was in the best interests of the child:

- In four cases, the Court suggested that involvement in sex work affected the parent’s ability to provide stability, permanency, and/or structure for the child;\textsuperscript{180}
- In one case, the Court considered the importance of continuity in the care of the child with the non-sex worker parent; and
- In two cases, the Court found that the child would be at risk of physical harm if returned to the sex worker parent.

I argue that in six of these seven cases, courts appeared to treat involvement in sex work as an adverse factor when considering what is in the best interests of the child \textit{without} considering the particular evidence regarding the sex worker parent and any impact of same on the child. I argue that in those six

\textsuperscript{179} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{180} The enumerated list of factors under the \textit{CFSA, supra} note 4, does not include stability, permanence, or structure. As will be described in Chapter 4: Family Law, these two factors are contained in s 24(2)(f) of the \textit{CLRA, supra} note 4 and are open to the Court to consider pursuant to s. 37(3) 13 of the \textit{CFSA} (“any other relevant circumstance”). The ability to provide permanence, stability, and structure could also reasonably fall within factor 37(3) 1.: the child’s physical, mental and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to meet those needs.
cases, the Court’s conclusions about the parent insofar as they related to sex work were informed by stigma, not fact.

In the seventh case, the Court directly connected the particular facts regarding the parent’s engagement in sex work to an adverse impact on the child. The child was sexually abused by a client that the parent had brought into the home.

To be clear, for the purpose of identifying stigma against sex workers in custody and access making, I refer only to excerpts of the decisions that shed light on how decisions regarding the best interests of a child appear to be influenced by a parent’s involvement in sex work. Courts often considered multiple factors affecting the child’s best interests—at least one shared precarity was noted in each case—and the weight afforded to all factors of any given case is not reflected in my descriptions. Child protection proceedings are by nature factually rich and critiquing each decision on its merits based on judicial consideration of the full factual matrix of each case is beyond the scope of this research.

*The child’s need for stability, permanence, and structure*

Stigma against sex work contributed to a finding that the parent could not provide the child with stability, permanency, and/or structure for the child in four cases.

When ruling that the mother could not provide a permanent and nurturing environment in *CCAS v LM*, Justice Maddalena appeared to rely upon the mother’s involvement in prostitution noted in an expert report as evidence that the children would be at a serious risk of maltreatment if returned to their mother.\(^{181}\) A portion of a report from expert witness Dr. Harris stated that “[p]erhaps the most concerning problem area has been LM’s pervasive problems with self-regulation over the years. She has engaged in numerous maladaptive methods for emotion regulation and self-soothing including drug and alcohol use, self-harm (suicide attempts), and high risk behaviour (prostitution)”\(^{182}\).

---

\(^{181}\) 2012 ONSC 1778 [*LM*].

\(^{182}\) *Ibid* at para 126.
Justice Maddalena appeared to accept Dr. Harris’ opinion that prostitution constitutes high risk behaviour in the absence of any evidence regarding the nature of the mother’s sex work, which I argue is further coloured by being included in same sentence as substance abuse and suicide attempts. She relied on Dr. Harris’ report to conclude that “it could take decades for LM to resolve the issues or indeed they may never actually resolve. This is concerning for the Court since it leads to the inevitable conclusion that children placed in her care would remain again at serious risk of maltreatment.”\textsuperscript{183} Crown wardship would provide “permanency and a nurturing parent environment” that the children required and the mother could not provide.\textsuperscript{184}

Justice Curtis referred to a sex worker mother’s prior involvement in prostitution to determine that she was unable to provide stability in \textit{Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v JB}.\textsuperscript{185} In the opening paragraphs, Justice Curtis summarized the mother’s pre-	extit{Bedford} “history of criminal behaviour, prostitution and drug use, prior to her pregnancy.”\textsuperscript{186} She noted that the mother “worked as a prostitute and used drugs from the age of 15” and had a “substantial criminal record, with convictions for prostitution, the sale of drugs, assault, vehicle theft and fraud. ... She had 45 charges regarding prostitution, and 15 convictions, including jail time for these convictions.”\textsuperscript{187}

Justice Curtis accepted expert evidence that the mother has “good insight into her past difficulties” and has “overcome a lot in her life”, yet still relied upon the mother’s past convictions as evidence of \textit{ongoing} poor judgment that rendered her unable to provide a stable home environment.\textsuperscript{188} The mother was deemed not able to “provide the child with ... stability and consistency” and, if returned to her care, the child would not have the “certainty, finality, and [the ability to] grow up in a safe and stable family, where he is valued and protected from harm.”\textsuperscript{189} Justice Curtis ordered crown wardship without access.

\begin{flushright}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{183} \textit{Ibid} at para 128.
\textsuperscript{184} \textit{Ibid} at para 176.
\textsuperscript{185} 2013 ONCJ 583 [JB].
\textsuperscript{186} \textit{Ibid} at para 7.
\textsuperscript{187} \textit{Ibid} at paras 25, 26
\textsuperscript{188} \textit{Ibid} at paras 33, 59, 76.
\textsuperscript{189} \textit{Ibid} at paras 79, 81.
\end{flushright}
I do not suggest that Justice Curtis was wrong to consider the mother’s criminal history. Under s. 50 (1) (b) the former CFSA, evidence of a parent’s past criminal history was admissible.\(^{190}\) I argue that the stigma against sex workers perpetuated by the pre-Bedford criminal scheme contributed to the uphill battle that the mother in \(JB\) faced during her proceedings. Perhaps the mother’s criminality in \(JB\) would have been considered in a different light if a large portion of her record was the result of unconstitutional laws.

In *Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v CH*,\(^{191}\) the applicant society brought a motion for crown wardship on summary judgment after learning that the mother would not be attending trial. The evidence of the society included multiple references to the mother’s sex work:

> [21] The mother has serious lifestyle problems including significant involvement with prostitution:

> a. She has a history of working as a prostitute since age 13.

> b. In early 2012 the Society discovered advertisements the mother had placed through on-line escort services. The mother admitted she placed the ads on the website, but claimed she had never followed through with the service.

> c. The mother recently advised a society worker that she had a better life when she was involved in prostitution.\(^{192}\)

Neither the society nor Justice Pazaratz, the presiding judge, explained how the mother’s history of sex work, advertisement of sex work, or her assertion that sex work provided a better life impacted the best interests of the child. Nevertheless, Justice Pazaratz relied on the society’s “thorough and unchallenged” evidence to conclude that the mother “lacks the skills, motivation and stability to be an appropriate caregiver for this young child”\(^{193}\) and ordered crown wardship without access.\(^{194}\)

For the fourth case where a court implied that sex work impacted the child’s need for permanency, Justice Duchesneau-McLachlan connected the location of the mother’s sex work and to her ability to provide

\(^{190}\) *CFSA, supra* note 4 at s. 50(1)(b) provides as follows: “Despite anything in the *Evidence Act* [RSO 1990, c E.23], in any proceeding under this Part ... any oral or written statement or report that the Court considers relevant to the proceeding, including a transcript, exhibit or finding or the reasons for a decision in an earlier civil or criminal proceeding, is admissible into evidence.”

\(^{191}\) 2014 ONSC 3731 [CH].

\(^{192}\) *Ibid* at para 21.

\(^{193}\) *Ibid* at para 24.

\(^{194}\) *Ibid* at para 34.
permanency for the child. The mother in B(J) was an exotic dancer with a history of substance abuse, which Justice Duchesneau-McLachlan discussed in detail throughout her decision. She did not refer to the mother’s exotic dancing until the concluding paragraphs, when she noted that the mother was “vulnerable to drug abuse and finds herself in a work environment where the temptations might be too great” (emphasis added). She stated that the mother was “courting disaster” by continuing to work as an exotic dancer at a location “well known” for drug use. Justice Duchesneau-McLachlan concluded that the child needed structured caregivers who can avoid drug use, and “cannot wait any longer for his parents to straighten out. His best interests dictate that he get a chance for a permanent home and committed parents” and ordered crown wardship without access.

I agree that courts should be concerned about a parent who is an addict working in an area where drugs are readily available, as substance abuse by a parent can certainly lead to adverse impacts on a child. I suggest, however, that Justice Duchesneau-McLachlan ought to have incorporated in further fact-finding when ruling that the mother’s drug use prevented her from providing permanency and stability. Instead, she relied upon a presumption that the temptations “might” be too great. Further, she does not explain what evidence he relied upon to find that the mother’s place of work is “well known” for drug use.

Continuity of the child’s care

Continuity of the child’s care with the non-sex worker parent was given preference in one case. Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v SAP et al involved an appeal of a final order granting custody of the children to the father by a former sex worker mother. The child had been in the care of the father while the mother took a number of what appeared to be society-required steps to overcome society concerns, including ceasing her involvement in sex work. During that time, the child developed a stable home with the father. Justice Shore acknowledged that the mother had made “significant progress since her first involvement with society, … overcome[ing] her involvement with drugs, escorting, and abusive partners”, yet held

195 Children’s Aid Society of Nipissing and Parry Sound v. B(J), 2010 ONCJ 34 [B(J)].
196 Ibid at paras 89.
197 Ibid at para 91.
198 Ibid at paras 84, 92.
199 Murnan (2018), supra note 96.
200 2019 ONSC 3482 [SAP].
201 SAP, supra note 200 at para 34.
that it was in the best interests of the child to remain with the father. It is not apparent from either decision what, if any, tangible impact the mother’s engagement in sex work had on the children.

The decision suggests that the society required that mother refrain from drug use, escorting, and associating with abusive partners, and that she complied. The time it took for the mother to comply with the terms—including exiting sex work—was the primary reason that the children were not returned to her care. Despite praising the mother’s progress, Justice Pawagi ordered (and Justice Shore upheld) that the most “significant factor” regarding the children’s best interests was “continuity of care.” The father was granted custody of the children because “during the time that [the mother’s progress] has taken, the children settled into their placement with their father. It would be in their best interests have that [sic] placement be permitted.”

**Ongoing risk of physical harm**

For two cases, parental engagement in sex work contributed to a determination that the child was at ongoing risk of physical harm. First, in *CCAS v. JF-G and NS*, the sex worker mother sought custody and access but could not attend trial as she was incarcerated. The father also sought custody. When reviewing the evidence against the mother, Justice Mazza noted that the society worker who apprehended the children had learned that, prior to apprehension, the mother “had been smoking crack and prostituting herself.” The father gave evidence that he separated from the mother after learning that she was “involved in prostitution and was consuming crack cocaine.” In his conclusion, Justice Mazza noted that the mother’s life “was one that included prostitution, alcoholism, drug addiction, a criminal record, alarming tendency to violence and that she is currently facing a charge of procuring young children for the purposes of prostitution. ... [T]o return the children to her care would clearly place them risk of both physical and emotional harm”.

---

203 *Ibid* at para 34, reference to para 31 of the reasons of Justice Pawagi.
204 2013 ONSC 6434 [*JF-G*].
206 *Ibid* at para 77.
207 *Ibid* at paras 120-121.
I query why Justice Mazza only mentioned, without any details or analysis, the procurement charges once at end of the +140-paragraph decision. Procurement of children is a serious offence and, if convicted, would be compelling evidence that the children would be at risk of harm if returned to the mother. However, we are not provided with any details regarding the mother’s procurement charge. Further, for the purpose of this research, it is relevant that Justice Mazza listed the mother’s involvement in “prostitution” separately from the procurement charge, implying that engagement in prostitution is as a negative factor in and of itself.

The mother’s involvement in sex work also had a negative impact on the father’s claim for custody in JF-G. During submissions, counsel for the society argued that the father demonstrated poor judgment by choosing to become involved with the mother. The society submitted that the father’s choice of a partner who was “involve[d] with prostitution, drug consumption and ... [was] prone to violence” did “not speak to the success of the future family’s constellation.” The society further submitted that the father was untrustworthy, in part due to “having not advised the society of [the mother’s] inappropriate behaviour, her tendency to violence, her involvement with prostitution, and her addiction to drugs. He was forthcoming on none of these very concerning circumstances.” Justice Mazza accepted the society’s submission that the father’s failure to report the mother’s “involvement in prostitution and her consumption of illicit drugs and alcohol while the children were in her care” demonstrated that he “clearly ... did not appreciate the importance of protecting [the children] in such a precarious environment.”

The three children were made crown wards without access to either parent.

Courts referred to an ongoing risk of physical harm in two appeal decisions from the DD v Children’s Aid Society of Toronto proceeding. These decisions contain one of the few fact patterns where the parent’s involvement in sex work appears to have had an explicit adverse impact on the child.

In both DD decisions, the mother is introduced as a sex trade worker. Justice Horkins and Justice Pardu both noted that the mother arrived in Canada from Romania in 1995 and “worked in the adult

---

208 Ibid at para 101.
209 Ibid at para 102.
210 Ibid at para 128.
211 2015 ONSC 4197 [DD ONSC] and 2015 ONCA 903 [DD ONCA].
entertainment business and as a sex trade worker.” The father was a client and had no further contact with the mother or the child.

The mother’s sex work is later raised by Justice Pardu when she upheld a decision of the trial judge (which does not appear to have been reported) to admit and rely upon disturbing hearsay evidence from the child. The child described being sexually abused by one of the mother’s clients in the home. Justice Pardu did not comment on the weight given to or impact of the child’s evidence at trial, or otherwise substantively consider the evidence in upholding the trial judge’s order for crown wardship without access. She only noted that the mother could not point to any trial unfairness arising from the admission of the hearsay evidence.

As noted, DD ONCA is one of the few decisions where an element of the parent’s particular manner of practicing sex work (bringing a client into the home while the child is present) is clearly connected to the harm experienced by the child (the client sexually abused the child). Unfortunately, neither Justice Horkins or Justice Pardu considered or unpacked the connection between the child’s hearsay evidence and the orders rendered—for example, by considering whether an order that the mother refrain from bringing clients home could adequately protect the child in the future—in their written reasons.

Sex work as part of a negative description of a parent

For nine of the nineteen sex worker parents, the presiding judges did not appear to apply sex work to any particular element of the legal analyses before them. Instead, judges referred to sex work as part of a negative description of the parent and/or their lifestyle. For cases involving former sex workers, judges referred to the parent’s past sex work without considering the limitations on adducing evidence regarding a parent’s past conduct provided in both Child Protection Acts.

212 DD ONSC, ibid at para 2; DD ONCA ibid at para 3.
213 Ibid.
214 DD ONCA, ibid at para 21.
215 Ibid at para 40.
216 CFSA, supra note 4, s 50(1)(a); CYFSA, 2017, supra note 4, s 93(1)(a).
Prior involvement in sex work appeared in a list of negative qualities of the father in Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. LDE. The father had been noted in default, and so the Court did not consider whether the father should be granted custody or access. The father’s involvement in sex work appeared in an excerpt from a parenting capacity assessment. The assessment listed the father’s past behavioural issues, including “... sexualized behaviours, prostituting himself, drug usage, theft from his parents, staying out late, refusing to take his medication for his social disorders and acts of violence (emphasis in original).”

Similarly, in Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. DB-S, Justice Murray referred to the mother’s sex work when describing her past issues with substance abuse:

D.B.-S.’s cocaine use continued, on and off, for over 25 years. Her cocaine use was accompanied by binge drinking of hard liquor. She sold drugs periodically, and eventually sold herself, working as a prostitute.

While the Court made no further references to sex work, Justice Murray later applauded the mother for her efforts to overcome her addictions and maintain a positive relationship with the child. Justice Murray refused the society’s request for crown wardship without access and placed the child in the custody of the father—who resided with the mother—with access to the mother.

Judges condemned a parent’s choice of choosing a sex worker as a romantic partner in two cases. First, in The Ottawa Children’s Aid Society v. CS the mother had three children with two different fathers, RP and PS. Both fathers were former sex workers. Justice McKinnon referred to the fathers’ involvement with sex work when describing their “tragic” and “hard” lives.

Regarding RP, Justice McKinnon noted at the onset of the decision that he was “seriously mentally ill and has had what can only be described as a tragic life as a result of his illness. He has been seriously addicted to both alcohol and drugs from a very early age and in the past engaged in male prostitution in order to

---

217 2012 ONCJ 530 [LDE].
218 Ibid at para 7.
220 2016 ONSC 3828 [CS].
221 Ibid at paras 4, 135.
feed his addiction”.\textsuperscript{222} RP’s children were made crown wards, partly due to the mother’s refusal to end her relationship with RP and parent the children on her own.

Justice McKinnon described PS as a former prostitute and pimp. PS “engaged in prostitution in order to get drugs and trafficked in drugs for a period of time.”\textsuperscript{223} In response to accusations from a former girlfriend that he was a pimp, PS “stated he did not feel he was a pimp but realized that he was benefitting from her prostitution and would encourage her to do it.”\textsuperscript{224} Justice McKinnon ordered crown wardship for PS’ daughter, explaining that that “PS’s lifestyle choices and highly unstable background make him incapable of providing a secure, predictable and stable environment for [his daughter], to ensure her healthy upbringing.”\textsuperscript{225}

The second case involving criticism of a non-sex worker parent for their choice of a sex worker partner is in Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. RB-H.\textsuperscript{226} Justice Zisman questioned the father’s judgment and insight partly due to the father’s “belief that the mother was a good parent to the children”,\textsuperscript{227} despite her demonstrated inability to meet the children’s needs and her involvement with “prostitution” and “the sex trade”.\textsuperscript{228} Justice Zisman also relied upon adverse evidence from a society witness regarding the mother, including how the mother “admitted to … working in the sex trade”\textsuperscript{229} during an interview with the society. I suggest that the use of term “admitted” suggests that evidence of sex work is viewed as harmful to the sex worker’s case. Justice Zisman ordered crown wardship without access.

The mother in Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v. AS et al was an escort and did not attend trial.\textsuperscript{230} The main issue before the Court was with respect to a parenting plan presented by the paternal grandmother of one of the children. When summarizing the evidence, Justice Pazaratz referred to the society’s concerns with escorting by the mother:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{222} Ibid at para 4.
\item \textsuperscript{223} Ibid at para 135.
\item \textsuperscript{224} Ibid at para 135.
\item \textsuperscript{225} Ibid at paras 179, 186.
\item \textsuperscript{226} 2015 ONCJ 389 [RB-H].
\item \textsuperscript{227} Ibid at para 184.
\item \textsuperscript{228} Ibid at paras 50, 59.
\item \textsuperscript{229} Ibid at para 80.
\item \textsuperscript{230} 2017 ONSC 2226 [AS]
\end{itemize}
[26] g. ... in July 2016 the Society received information the mother was working as an escort. Although the mother initially denied this, she eventually admitted to escorting. She said the partner she had been living with had introduced her to this. She later admitted to the Society that her work as an escort is one of the reasons she hasn’t been able to attend for access regularly.\textsuperscript{231}

The impact to the child appears to arise from the mother’s failure to attend access, not a specific aspect of sex work. I question whether the society’s response would have been if the mother had missed access for a socially acceptable line of work.

When discussing harm to the children, Justice Pazaratz referred to the mother’s decision to engage in escorting in the same paragraph as severe domestic violence:

\textbf{[26] j.} [The mother] has shown no insight into the impact of exposing her children to domestic violence. She has failed to protect them from real and foreseeable dangers which resulted in A.S.-P. not only witnessing but also suffering horrible abuse. ... She continues to pursue a dangerous and unstable lifestyle, unaware or unconcerned about the danger her decision to escort presents to her own safety and any child placed in her care.\textsuperscript{232}

Justice Pazaratz did not explain what evidence he relied upon to conclude that the mother’s work as an escort endangered her children, particularly when the domestic violence referred to at the beginning of the paragraph was inflicted upon the mother by intimate partners, not by clients.\textsuperscript{233}

I located two cases where sex work was relied upon to describe a parent’s problematic history and the fact that a parent was no longer involved in sex work received favourable treatment by the Court. First, in \textit{Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. CM}, Justice Murray noted the mother’s involvement in sex work when describing her “difficult life”.\textsuperscript{234} At a young age, the mother had been “steered her into prostitution.”\textsuperscript{235} Prior to the birth of the child, she “was convicted of a number of criminal offences, most of which involved possession of cocaine, prostitution and failure to attend court or to comply with probation orders.”\textsuperscript{236} When providing an updated description of the mother, Justice Murray referred to

\textsuperscript{231} \textit{Ibid} at para 26 g.  
\textsuperscript{232} \textit{Ibid} at para 26 j.  
\textsuperscript{233} \textit{Ibid} at paras 26 g.  
\textsuperscript{234} 2011 ONCJ 648 [CM] at para 14.  
\textsuperscript{235} \textit{Ibid} at para 15.  
\textsuperscript{236} \textit{Ibid} at para 16.
prostitution and drug use as two “major obstacles to being an adequate parent” that the mother had successfully dealt with.\textsuperscript{237} Both children were made temporary society wards with supervised access, with one child to be returned to the mother in two months subject to a supervision order.

Second, in \textit{Children's Aid Society of Oxford County v. CL},\textsuperscript{238} Justice Paull summarized the “traumatic personal history” of the mother—a former sex worker—at the onset of the decision. He described the mother as a victim, noting that she suffered from “a diagnosis of PTSD related to being a victim of human trafficking, violence, and prostitution”.\textsuperscript{239} Justice Paull recognized that the mother had overcome difficult facets of her life and was generally a good parent. He placed the child in temporary society care but noted that he would have placed the child in the care and custody of the mother had she agreed to live apart from the abusive father.\textsuperscript{240}

And finally, perhaps the most disturbing language to describe a sex worker appeared in \textit{Children's Aid Society of Algoma v. LP}.\textsuperscript{241} Justice Kukurin referred to the mother’s involvement in sex work only at the beginning of the decision when explaining why he would not consider placing the children with her. He described the mother as an “attractive prostitute” with chronic substance abuse problems and as a “tragic waste of life”.\textsuperscript{242}

\textbf{Conclusion}

In the above cases, sex work was treated as a negative quality in a parent rather than as an aspect of a parent’s life that warranted further factual exploration. Overall, courts appeared to rely more upon negative assumptions or stigma about sex work and sex workers than on evidence regarding the actual impact (if any) of a particular parent’s involvement in sex work upon their child in Child Protection hearings in Ontario.

\textsuperscript{237} \textit{Ibid} at para 71.
\textsuperscript{238} 2019 ONCJ 923 [CL].
\textsuperscript{239} \textit{Ibid} at para 6.
\textsuperscript{240} \textit{Ibid} at paras 4, 79.
\textsuperscript{241} 2011 ONCJ 712 [LP].
\textsuperscript{242} \textit{Ibid} at para 6.
In one hundred percent of the Child Protection cases, a parent’s past or present involvement in sex work had a negative impact on the parent’s claim for custody or access at some point during the proceeding, ranging from an unfavourable description of the parent to a contributing factor for an order that crown wardship without access is in the best interests of the child. I argue that stigma against sex work and sex workers is a primary driver of those negative impacts.

In seventeen of the nineteen Child Protection cases, courts appeared to accept that sex work was incompatible with parenting yet did not explain how sex work effects the child. In contrast, the Courts only connected a parent’s involvement in sex work with a negative impact on a child in two of the nineteen cases.\(^{243}\)

\(^{243}\) In B(J), supra note 195; DD ONCA, supra note 211.
Chapter 4: Family law

In contrast to the imbalance of power that is inherent in Child Protection proceedings, custody and access disputes in Family Law custody are usually between two parents who are presumed to be of equivalent footing. Barring certain circumstances, a child’s parents are equally entitled to custody and a child should have as much contact with each parent as is consistent with their best interests.

Chapter 4 follows a similar format to Chapter 3. First, I outline the Family Law legislative schemes applicable in Ontario: the provincial CLRA and the federal Divorce Act (“the Family Law Acts”). Second, I provide an overview of statistical data arising from the Family Law case law. Third, I analyse the apparent impact of parental engagement with sex work on claims for custody and access in Family Law decisions.

My conclusion in this Chapter is similar to Chapter 3: for sex workers involved in custody and access disputes, stigma can carry more weight at trial than evidence (or a lack thereof).

Family Law legislation: The Ontario Children’s Law Reform Act and the Federal Divorce Act

The Family Law Acts govern private custody and access disputes in Ontario. Section 16 of the Divorce Act applies exclusively to married parents obtaining a divorce and Part III of the CLRA applies to all parents, including those in common law spousal relationships.

As with the Child Protection proceedings, custody and access proceedings brought under the Family Law Acts contain parallel substantive and procedural elements. Both contain similar:

i. paramount purposes;
ii. application processes for commencing proceedings;
iii. available orders;

---

244 CLRA, supra note 4, ss 20(1), (7).
245 Divorce Act, supra note 4, s 16(1).
246 For a side-by-side comparison of the relevant provisions of the CLRA, supra note 4 and the Divorce Act, ibid, please see Appendix C.
247 CLRA, ibid; Divorce Act, ibid.
iv. factors that a court must consider when making an order in the best interests of a child; and
v. limitations on what evidence regarding a parent’s past conduct is admissible during a hearing.

Paramount purpose

Like Child Protection laws, the Family Law Acts work to ensure that applications for custody and access are determined on the basis of the best interests of the child.248

Family Law proceedings are commenced by application to the Court

Custody and access proceedings under the CLRA are commenced when a parent, or any other person, seeking a custody and access order makes an application to the court.249 Applications must be accompanied by an affidavit that includes information regarding the applicant’s involvement in any Child Protection or criminal proceedings, and any other information relevant to the child’s best interest. While the CLRA does not refer to a respondent’s obligations, Rule 35.1(2) of the Family Law Rules confirms that if an answer to an application includes a claim for custody of or access to a child, the answering party shall also serve and file an affidavit in support of the claim.250 Under the Divorce Act, a parent seeking an order for custody of and/or access to a child of the marriage can commence a proceeding by way of application.251 A person other than a married spouse requires leave of the Court to make an application.252

Available orders

When making an order for custody and access under the CLRA, a court may do any of the following:

(a) grant the custody of or access to the child to one or more persons;
(b) determine any aspect of the incidents of the right to custody or access; and
(c) make any additional orders the Court deems necessary.253

248 CLRA, ibid, s 19(a); Divorce Act, ibid, s 16(8).
249 CLRA, ibid, ss 21(1), (2).
251 Divorce Act, supra note 4, ss 16(1)-(3).
252 Ibid, s 16(3).
253 CLRA, supra note 4, s 28(1).
Custody orders under the CLRA may be for joint (i.e., shared) or sole custody of a child, and can pertain to physical custody, where a child lives with the parent, and/or the right to be involved in significant decision-making. Once an order for custody or access has been made, a court may only vary the order if there has been a material change in circumstances that affects or is likely to affect the best interests of the child.\textsuperscript{254}

The Divorce Act grants broad discretion to courts to make orders regarding custody and access—including interim or joint custody or access—of a child of the marriage on any such terms, conditions, or restrictions as it thinks fit.\textsuperscript{255}

\textbf{Any custody or access order must be in the best interests of the child}

Custody and access disputes under both Family Law Acts must be determined only on the basis of what is in the best interests of the child.

The CLRA provides an inexhaustive list of considerations affecting the child’s best interests.\textsuperscript{257} When rendering an order for custody and access, courts shall consider “all the child’s needs and circumstances”, including:

\begin{itemize}
\item[(a)] the love, affection and emotional ties between the child and
\begin{itemize}
\item[(i)] each person, including a parent or grandparent, entitled to or claiming custody of or access to the child;
\item[(ii)] other members of the child’s family who reside with the child, and
\item[(iii)] persons involved in the child’s care and upbringing;
\end{itemize}
\item[(b)] the child’s views and preferences, if they can reasonably be ascertained;
\item[(c)] the length of time the child has lived in a stable home environment;
\item[(d)] the ability and willingness of each person applying for custody of the child to provide the child with guidance and education, the necessaries of life and any special needs of the child;
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{254} Ibid, s 29.  
\textsuperscript{255} Divorce Act, supra note 4, ss 16(4)-(6)  
\textsuperscript{256} CLRA, supra note 4, s 24(1); Divorce Act, \textit{ibid}, s 16(8).  
\textsuperscript{257} Ibid, s 24(2).
(e) the plan proposed by each person applying for custody of or access to the child for the child’s care and upbringing;
(f) the permanence and stability of the family unit with which it is proposed that the child will live;
(g) the ability of each person applying for custody of or access to the child to act as a parent; and
(h) any familial relationship between the child and each person who is a party to the application.\(^{258}\)

The *Divorce Act* does not contain a list of considerations. Instead, section 16 simply provides that the Court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the marriage as determined by reference to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child.\(^{259}\)

**Past conduct of a parent**

Under the *CLRA*, evidence regarding a person’s past conduct is only admissible if it relates to their ability to act as a parent.\(^{260}\) When assessing a person’s ability to act as a parent, the Court shall consider whether the person has at any time committed violence or abuse against a spouse, a parent of the subject child, a member of the person’s household, or any child.\(^{261}\) Anything done in self-defence, or to protect another person is not to be considered violence or abuse.\(^{262}\) In divorce proceedings, a court shall not take into consideration the past conduct of any person unless the conduct is relevant to the ability of that person to act as a parent of a child.\(^{263}\)

**A note on Bill C-78: Amendments to the *Divorce Act***

On June 21, 2019, Bill C-78, which proposed substantial amendments to Canada’s federal Family Law regime regarding divorce, separation, and parenting, received Royal Ascent.\(^{264}\) The amendments will come into effect on March 1, 2021.

\(^{258}\) *Ibid*, s 24(2).
\(^{259}\) *Divorce Act*, supra note 4, s 16(8).
\(^{260}\) *CLRA*, supra note 4, s 24(3)(a), (b).
\(^{261}\) *CLRA*, *ibid*, s 24(4)(a)-(d).
\(^{262}\) *CLRA*, *ibid*, s 24(5).
\(^{263}\) *Divorce Act*, supra note 4, s 16(9).
\(^{264}\) *Bill C-78: An Act to amend the Divorce Act, the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act and the Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act and to make consequential amendments to another Act*, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2019 (as passed on June 21, 2019) [*Bill C-78*].
The terms “custody” and “access” do not appear in the new *Divorce Act*. Instead, courts will make parenting and contact orders.\(^{265}\) A parenting order may contain terms and conditions regarding the allocation of parenting time and decision-making responsibilities; means of communication between parents, children, and other persons with parenting time or decision-making responsibilities; and any other relevant matter.\(^{266}\) Contact orders contain terms regarding contact, such as visits and communications, between a parent and a child.\(^{267}\) According to parliamentary debates, the change in terminology is meant to alleviate the adversarial nature of divorce proceedings by reducing the semblance of a winning litigant who is granted custody, and a losing litigant who is granted access.

Perhaps most significantly, the *Divorce Act* will be amended to prescribe a list of best interests factors that courts must consider when making parenting and contact orders:\(^{268}\)

(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;
(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each spouse, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;
(c) each spouse’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other spouse;
(d) the history of care of the child;
(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;
(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;
(g) any plans for the child’s care;
(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the other would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;
(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;

---

\(^{266}\) *Ibid*, s 16.1(4).
\(^{267}\) *Ibid*, s 16.5(4).
\(^{268}\) *Bill C-78, supra* note 264, ss 16(1), 16.1(1).
(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things
   (i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and
       meet the needs of the child, and
   (ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the
       order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and
(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety,
    security, and well-being of the child.

Overview of results

Procedurally, Family Law disputes are simpler than Child Protection proceedings. Parents must only
demonstrate that the custody or access order they seek is in the best interests of the child. I have thus
organized my analysis of the Family Law cases by the parent’s status as a sex worker (past or present) and
outcome.

I located eight relevant Family Law cases and twelve allegation cases.269 Four cases involved parents who
were engaged in sex work at the time of trial:

- One mother sought sole custody. She was awarded joint custody of the child, with primary care
to the father.
- One mother sought and was denied custody.
- One father sought access, which was denied.
- One mother requested increased access to her child as a result of parental alienation by the
  father, which was granted. It is not clear from the decision why the sex worker mother did not
  originally have custody of the child.

269Allegation cases: Porter v Hamilton, 2011 ONSC 5792; Sangha v Meighan, 2012 ONSC 2362; Avakian v Natiotis,
2012 ONCJ 584; Aza v Zagrouditski, 2014 ONCJ 293; JBH v TLG, 2014 ONSC 3569; GTB v ZBB, 2014 ONCJ 382;
Facchini v Bourre, 2015 ONSC 763; VB v MM, 2016 ONCJ 98; TEH v GJR, 2016 ONCJ 156; Daher v Khanafer, 2016
Four cases involved parents who formerly engaged in sex work:

- Three mothers were awarded custody of the child. Courts appeared to treat the fact that the parent no longer engaged in sex work favourably.
- One mother sought, but was not, awarded custody. The mother had previously abandoned her child to pursue sex work in another province. The Court appeared to approve of the mother’s subsequent decision to leave sex work but felt that placement with a person who had cared for the child during the mother’s absence was in the child’s best interests.

Like the Child Protection cases, the Family Law cases are factually rich. None of the Family Law decisions were rendered solely—or even primarily—based on the parent’s sex work. Again, all of the sex worker parents experienced at least one shared precarity at some point in their lives. Even so, judicial treatment of sex work throughout the Family Law cases further demonstrates the impact of stigma on sex workers in custody and access disputes.

**Law & analysis**

*Parents involved in sex work at the time of hearing*

I located four cases that illustrate how stigma against sex work can adversely impact the claims of a parent involved in sex work at the time of a proceeding.

The mother in *Fias v. Souto* was a stripper and a masseuse. Evidence of her involvement in sex work weakened the positive evidence that a clinical investigator from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer provided on behalf of the mother. After testifying to the strength of the mother’s parenting skills, the investigator acknowledged on cross-examination by counsel for the father that she was unaware that Ms. Fias had been working as a ‘stripper’ or in a ‘body rub parlour’. The witness admitted that she would need to understand the situation better to know how this would affect mother’s lifestyle.

---

270 [2015 ONSC 880 (Fias)].
271 *Ibid* at para 41.
The father in *Fias* raised the mother’s sex work during his evidence in chief when expressed concerns about the mother’s parenting abilities. He gave evidence that he “question[ed] [the mother’s] choice of employment and denie[d] that he knew of [the mother’s] previous employment (until she was three months’ pregnant) as an exotic dancer.” 272 The mother’s direct evidence was that she worked as a server at that time, but later “admitted” to exotic dancing on cross-examination. 273

When assessing the credibility of the mother, Justice Stevenson noted that the mother had been “less than forthright with respect to providing details regarding her current employment …. I accept [the mother’s] evidence that her current employment as a masseuse is not employment that she is comfortable with; however, this information should have been provided to allow [the clinical investigator to have full information before her while she completed her investigation.” 274

Justice Stevenson nevertheless held that the mother was a good parent with a loving relationship with her child and ordered joint custody, with primary care for the father. Unfortunately, part of the mother’s success appears to have come from her apologetic attitude towards sex work. Justice Stevenson accepted the mother’s evidence that she was not comfortable with her employment, noting that she “often feels sick about” her work as an exotic masseuse. 275 The mother’s counsel submitted that she was taking steps to find “meaningful employment” and only worked as a masseuse to “survive”. 276

Overall, it is unclear from the decision how the Court, the parties, and the witnesses in *Fias* believed the mother’s sex work actually affected the children.

The mother and father in *Rivest-Marier v. Emond* both sought sole custody of a six-year-old boy. The opening paragraphs of Justice Shelston’s decision contain a refreshing example of judicial neutrality towards sex work. 277 When reviewing the backgrounds of the parents, Justice Shelston noted that the parents met when the father managed a strip club where the mother worked as a dancer, and that the

---

272 *Ibid* at para 55.
273 *Ibid* at paras 80, 84, 97.
274 *Ibid* at para 49.
276 *Ibid* at para 190.
277 2017 ONSC 4197 [*Rivest-Marier*].
mother worked as a dancer up until she became pregnant. Justice Shelston did not explicitly rely on the mother’s past sex work when ruling that sole custody to the father was in the best interests of the child.

Still, the mother’s sex work had at least two adverse impacts on the mother during the course of the dispute between the parents. First, the Court noted that relatives encouraged the father to commence custody proceedings because they were concerned about the mother’s depression and involvement in prostitution, and the impact of same on her parenting abilities. Still, the mother’s sex work had at least two adverse impacts on the mother during the course of the dispute between the parents. First, the Court noted that relatives encouraged the father to commence custody proceedings because they were concerned about the mother’s depression and involvement in prostitution, and the impact of same on her parenting abilities. Second, at trial, the testimony of an aunt who provided evidence on behalf of the mother was weakened on cross-examination because the aunt “had never heard that the mother worked in a Swedish massage parlor”, a fact that mother eventually “admitted”. Again, the Rivest-Marier decision does not clarify how the mother’s work allegedly affected the children.

A parent with a long history in sex work brought a motion to restart access to her children in HP v. PLC. The parent acknowledged a violent history—including sexual offenses against the mother—but submitted that there had been a material change in circumstances affecting the best interests of the children because she was ready to be present in her children’s lives and had dealt with her charges. Her motion was deemed to have no merit and was dismissed.

There is no question that domestic violence, which appears to have been significant in HP, can harm a child. Domestic violence as a stand-alone factor could have been sufficient to warrant an order for no access in HP. For the purpose of this research, however, it is noteworthy that Justice Hardman stated at the onset of her decision that her concern regarding the past sexual abuse of the mother had been “noted”, however there were a “number of other problems” regarding the parent’s sexual history. Justice Hardman then proceeded to consider the parent’s involvement in sex work separately from the parent’s violent history.

Justice Hardman summarized the evidence regarding the parent’s sex work in HP as follows:

[35] Despite [the parent’s] attempt in her materials to suggest that her participation in prostitution was historical, it is clear that it has continued throughout these

---

278 Ibid at para 10.
279 Ibid at paras 33, 38.
280 HP, supra note 78.
proceedings. The advertisements filed invite paying customers to contact her by the cell phone number used by [the parent.] Further there is the offer of "incall" times at her home and "outcall" times elsewhere in the community. It appears that [the parent] even offers her services weekends.

[36] While [the parent] has denied that she entertains clients in her home, the phrasing of the advertisements is of concern. One advertisement on the internet sets out where she is prepared to engage in sex: “my place, his place, outdoors, restroom, bathhouse, theatre, truck stop or gym”.

The parent’s sex work had negative implications for the parent at five points during the decision. First, Justice Hardman reviewed a counsellor’s report confirming the parent demonstrated an “appropriate understanding of normative sexual behaviour’ … and ‘was able to identify ‘pre-offense factors’ and develop a list of warning signs to avoid.” Despite the conclusions in the report that the parent was able to deal with inappropriate sexual urges, the Court commented that “surely the participation of [the parent] as an escort-prostitute is exactly the impersonal sex risk factor that [she] planned to avoid.” In deciding to give little weight to the report, the Court concluded that “Given [the parent’s] current lifestyle both for money and leisure, it would seem that any conclusions about risk from the report must be considered unreliable. [The parent] herself states on some of the advertisements that she is “drug and disease free”, identifying risks that are part of her lifestyle.”

Second, Justice Hardman appeared to reject supportive evidence of the sex worker’s parenting skills provided by her partner’s parents. The sex worker had a child from another relationship, and the witnesses had seen the sex worker exhibit positive parenting skills. Nevertheless, Justice Hardman appeared to discredit the evidence from the in-laws because “whether [the witnesses are] aware of the background of [the parent] or the life style [sic] chosen by her... is unknown.”

Third, Justice Hardman concluded that the parent’s online advertisements and involvement in sex work demonstrates that she “clearly has not thought of the potential consequences of such revealing exposure of herself and lifestyle to her own children and family. What [the parent] does on the net, for work and recreation, is all about her and her focus on her own needs and not about any care taken about potential

281 Ibid.
282 Ibid at para 34.
283 Ibid at para 34.
284 Ibid at para 41.
285 Ibid at para 53.
repercussions on her children.”286 Justice Hardman did provide some factual context regarding the parent’s sex work (i.e., in calls and out calls, working weekends) but did not explain what the “potential repercussions” the mother’s sex work might have on the children.

Fourth, Justice Hardman appeared to accept the mother’s submissions that the parent’s engagement in sex work was a sufficient reason to deny the parent’s request for access. Justice Hardman explained that the mother “has told the Court that she decided that it was not in the best interests of her children [to have access to the sex worker parent] based on all the information she had, and that the confirmation that [the sex worker parent] continued to prostitute made her realize that it had been the right decision.”287 Justice Hardman agreed with the mother, concluding that the sex worker parent’s “untreated historical issues, her recreational pursuits, her risky employment and her without-boundary behaviour on the internet would raise alarms about the suitability of any person to parent.”288 Justice Hardman accepted that “the mother does not want the choices that [the parent] has made to be part of her children’s lives given their differences in values. In the circumstances, her concerns are not unreasonable.”289

Fifth, Justice Hardman concluded that the parent had a lack of focus on the children, in part because “she could have chosen a life style [sic] that would allow her to contribute to both the emotional and financial stability of these children.”290 In the end, despite strong condemnation for the parent’s work and lifestyle choices, it does not appear that Justice Hardman made any connection with the sex worker parent’s lifestyle to her request for access. She concluded that:

Perhaps the most important consideration is the fact that the children are happy, stable and secure in the home where they are. The mother and her husband work diligently to ensure that the girls have everything that they need. In considering best interests, the Court must consider that family unit and ensure that no decision will adversely affect the stability of that home.291

286 Ibid at para 43.
287 Ibid at para 67.
288 Ibid at para 95.
289 Ibid at para 105.
290 Ibid at para 98.
291 Ibid at para 106.
While the parent “proposed to have the children come visit her and become part of her life”, she did not propose a change of residence for the children or that would otherwise appear to affect the stability of the home. Further, the Court did not consider a form of access that would not require contact between the sex worker parent and the mother, or that the children attend the sex worker parent’s home, such as supervised access at an access centre.

I located one case that illustrates that stigma against sex workers contributes to their risk of being alienated from their children. Volikis & Jakubowska explain that alienation occurs when one parent tells the child that the other parent is not a good parent, is a bad person, or otherwise attempts to “poison ... a child’s mind against the other parent.”

In Lopez v. Dotzko, the mother, an exotic dancer, moved for increased access to because the father continuously refused to allow the mother to see the child. The father’s pleadings and evidence at trial contained numerous disparaging references to the mother’s work as an exotic dancer. He claimed that the mother’s profession “compromised her ability to parent [the child]” and was “incompatible with ‘healthy family environment’”. The father also claimed that she had “inappropriate relationships” with clients, including accepting gifts.

Justice Price found that the father’s remarks about the mother in Lopez were evidence of alienation. He noted that parental alienation arises “from a combination of programming indoctrinations by one parent adding to and/or colouring a child’s own feelings toward the other parent causing a negative emotional atmosphere between the child and the parent victim.” Justice Price held that the father’s negative attitude towards the mother created such a negative emotional atmosphere, and significantly increased the mother’s access rights.

---

292 Ibid at para 99.
294 2011 ONSC 6778 [Lopez].
295 Ibid at para 42.
296 Ibid at para 43.
297 Ibid at para 43.
298 Ibid at para 109.
Treatment of past involvement in sex work

I located four Family Law cases involving former sex workers. In each of these cases, the fact that the parent left sex work was treated favourably by the presiding judge.

Griffiths v. Leonard involved a motion by a former stripper for access to a 9-year-old child. Justice Blishen provided the following overview of the mother’s history:

[27] There is no question that Elizabeth manipulated and deceived her parents while in a relationship with Nicolas Leonard. Her lifestyle, unbeknownst to her parents, involved drugs, alcohol and partying. She was subjected to ongoing abuse by Nicolas Leonard, most of which she hid from her parents who considered her to be an ideal daughter. In addition, she worked briefly at a Gatineau strip club, which she also hid from her parents.299

Justice Blishen found that the mother had overcome her difficult past, and was able to provide a stable, loving home environment for the child:

Nevertheless, despite these difficulties as a teenager, I find based on all the evidence that Elizabeth Griffiths has turned her life around. Once she terminated her relationship with Nicolas Leonard, she obtained full-time employment, met David, got married, and now is happily raising both Isabelle and baby Melissa with the assistance of her husband and her parents. She has a close supportive extended family and both children appear to be thriving in their mother’s care.300

Angus v. Angus chronicles how a mother, a former “masseuse in the adult entertainment industry”, expressed shame of and hid her work, left the industry, and improved her life. She was ultimately awarded custody. The mother gave evidence that “she felt that she did not have many options without a formal education. She did not want to return to massage following the birth of her child but felt that the family needed the money.” The mother testified that the father supported her work because of the financial benefit. Justice Howard accepted that the father did not object to the mother’s return to work and was “certainly complicit in the decision.”302

300 Ibid at para 27.
302 Ibid at para 24.
Justice Howard described how the mother experienced shame as a result of her work, noting that “[the] job was not something that Ms. Angus was proud of, and she did not want people to know what she did for a living. Ms. Angus strived to keep her employment in the adult entertainment industry separate and apart from her day-to-day life.” He was careful to note that the mother “did not engage in prostitution.” She would “remove her clothes while she performed the massage, but there was no sexual intercourse.” The mother “stopped working in the adult entertainment industry” two years before trial and was in the process of furthering her education. The Court agreed that the mother was a “devoted, committed mother … [and a] caring parent who is able to safely and appropriately parent [the child]”.

When describing the background of the parties’ relationship in *Melanie Gillett v. James Gratton*, Justice Charbonneau explained that “when [the parties] met, the [mother] was a sex trade worker. She was 16 years old and a heavy drug user. She had been brought into this unfortunate and dangerous lifestyle by her much older sister, Christine, who was herself a sex worker and a heavy drug user. The [father] was 42 years old and a client of Christine.” The Court noted that Ms. Gillett “terminated her sex trade involvement” when she moved in with the father. After being subjected to domestic abuse, the mother left the father and commenced an application for custody.

Justice Charbonneau granted full custody to the mother, noting that the child had been well cared for. Further, the Court granted the mother’s request to allow her to relocate to Germany with the child. In coming to this decision, the Court noted that the mother “has had a very difficult and problematic period when she was only 15 years old. She has however taken important steps to improve her situation” and would be in a better position to continue to improve herself in Germany.

The final Family Law case, *Hernandez v. Nikas*, is the only one of the four cases involving a former sex worker where the Court connects the evidence related to the mother’s sex work and the child’s best interests to hold that the mother should not have custody of the child. *Hernandez* involved a dispute between a mother who worked as an exotic dancer and Ms. Stewart, a long-time caregiver of the child. In

---

303 *Ibid* at para 19.
304 *Ibid* at para 19.
305 *Ibid* at para 75.
306 2018 ONSC 362 [*Gillett*].
308 2017 ONSC 162 [*Hernandez*].
this case, the mother effectively abandoned her child by moving from Ontario to Alberta to dance. She left the child in Ms. Stewart’s care for several years.\textsuperscript{309}

When ruling that it was in the child’s best interests for Ms. Stewart to have custody, the Court primarily relied upon the mother’s absence in the child’s life and Ms. Stewart’s demonstrated ability to provide the child with structure, and a permanent and stable home.\textsuperscript{310} There was a tangible connection between the mother’s choice to engage in sex work in a location far away from her son and his best interests. Even so, aside from the fact that dancing was the reason for the mother’s absence, it is unclear how the act of exotic dancing had negative impact on the child.

The evidence regarding the mother’s sex work in *Hernandez* was prominently used to negatively describe the mother and her lifestyle. When summarizing the background evidence of the relationship between the parties, Justice Henderson explained that the mother originally told Ms. Stewart that she worked as a hairstylist in Toronto, but eventually “confessed” that she was an exotic dancer and providing escort services.\textsuperscript{311} I again suggest that the use of terms “confessed”, like “admitted”, suggests a view that exotic dancing and escorting are shameful activities. Justice Henderson later notes that after moving to Alberta, the mother was “caught up in the lifestyle of an exotic dancer”.\textsuperscript{312} Again, I suggest that Justice Henderson’s language reflects a negative view of exotic dancing.

When assessing the mother’s credibility, Justice Henderson noted that the mother “apologized so often about the poor decisions she has made that she lacked sincerity.” The Court found that the mother did not have the capabilities to properly parent the child, living a life in “turmoil … without stability, replete with conflict, drug addictions, and a self-indulgent lifestyle. [Although] she has made some strides towards self-improvement … I am skeptical to believe that she can sustain it.”\textsuperscript{313}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{309} Ibid at para 12. \\
\textsuperscript{310} Ibid at paras 105-106. \\
\textsuperscript{311} Ibid at para 11. \\
\textsuperscript{312} Ibid at para 22. \\
\textsuperscript{313} Ibid at para 94.
\end{flushright}
Conclusion

The Family Law cases further illustrate the negative impact of stigma against sex work in custody and access disputes. Like the Child Protection decisions, in one hundred percent of the Family Law cases, a parent’s past or present involvement in sex work had a negative impact on the parent’s claim for custody or access at some point during the proceeding. Such negative impacts again ranged from a descriptive aspect of a parent’s difficult past (Griffiths)\textsuperscript{314} or as a contributing factor for severing the parent-child relationship (HP).\textsuperscript{315} Overall, seven of the eight decisions contain no indication of how sex work actually, or even allegedly, affected the child (the exception being Hernandez).\textsuperscript{316}

I noted an increase in the level of description devoted to the type of sex work that the parent engaged in among the Family Law cases. Only one decision simply referred to the sex worker as a “sex trade worker” (Gillett)\textsuperscript{317} and, unlike several of the Child Protection cases, none of the Family Law cases referred to the parent as a “prostitute”.

---

\textsuperscript{314} Supra note 299.
\textsuperscript{315} Supra note 78.
\textsuperscript{316} Supra note 308.
\textsuperscript{317} Supra note 306.
Chapter 5: Discussion

This chapter contains a discussion of my results. I begin by noting that my research confirms two trends from the literature noted in Chapter 2. I then explain the apparent impact of stigma in custody and access disputes arising from my results. I conclude with suggestions for further research.

The case law confirms key findings of the sociological and sociolegal research

My research supports two common findings regarding sex worker parents from the sociological and sociolegal literature discussed in Chapter 2.

First, my research suggests that the findings of Susan Dewey, Putu Duff, Kathleen S. Kenny, and others that sex worker parents involved in Child Protection proceedings frequently lose custody of their children hold true in Ontario.\(^\text{318}\) My results further suggest that sex worker parents involved in private Family Law disputes in Ontario experience low levels of success at trial. For parents involved in sex work at the time of trial, eight out of eight parents noted in the Child Protection case law and three out of four parents noted in the Family Law case law were not granted custody of the child that was the subject of the proceeding. Further, in all cases where a former sex worker was granted custody of a child, evidence that the parent was no longer involved in sex work appeared to bolster their claim.

Second, my results are consistent with earlier findings that sex worker parents frequently experience at least one shared precarity.\(^\text{319}\) One hundred percent of the sex worker parents (past and present) noted in the case law experienced substance abuse, domestic violence, poverty/homeless, or compromised mental health. Given the factually-rich nature of all custody and access disputes, I did not analyse or compare the weight given to evidence regarding the shared precarities and sex work by judges, nor did I critique the outcomes of the decisions. Such analyses would have been beyond the scope of this initial, exploratory research.

---

\(^{318}\) Dewey et al, supra note 11; Duff et al (2014), supra note 47; Kenny, supra note 90; 
\(^{319}\) Dewey et al, ibid.
No apparent impact on case law from *Bedford*

I did not note any substantive changes to courts’ treatment of sex work within the case law following *Bedford* and the 2014 amendments to the *Criminal Code*.\(^{320}\) In fact, I did not locate any decisions that acknowledged the changes to Canada’s prostitution laws.

*Case law suggests that, in custody and access disputes, courts may rely more upon stigma against sex work and sex workers than on evidence*

We know that sex workers lead diverse lives and that custody and access disputes are supposed to be decided on the specific facts of each case. Even so, the case law demonstrates that evidence regarding parental involvement in sex work—a broad profession that encompasses parents from across the socioeconomic spectrum—is generally treated as an adverse factor in custody and access cases without full consideration of the evidence of the case. Often, judges simply noted that the parent was involved in prostitution or the sex trade. We were not told whether the parent was involved in street-based or indoor sex work, even though such sex workers may have very different lifestyles.\(^{321}\) In other cases, judges offered slightly more information by describing the particular type of sex work, such as an escort, dancer, or masseuse. However, those judges still did not discuss other aspects of employment that would commonly be relevant in custody and access disputes, such as hours worked and remuneration, even though such factors can influence the parent’s ability to meet the child’s needs.\(^{322}\)

For one hundred percent of the sex worker parents described in the case law, sex work appeared to have an adverse impact on the parent’s claim. In all twenty-seven cases, the manner in which sex work was presented in evidence by a party to the proceeding and/or considered by the court appeared to have a negative impact on the views and assessment of the sex worker’s parenting capacity. However, courts only referred to evidence about the specific nature of the parent’s involvement in sex work in six of the twenty-seven cases (two Child Protection and four Family Law). Within those six cases, courts only drew

\(^{320}\) *Bedford, supra* note 1; *Criminal Code, supra* note 1.


\(^{322}\) Granger-Brown *et al*, *supra* note 106; Witt, *supra* note 107; Stranger, *supra* note 3.
connections between that evidence and an impact on the child in three cases (one Child Protection and two of the Family Law).

The case law reveals a judicial tendency to rely upon negative stigma and assumptions about sex work and sex workers as opposed to requiring evidence about the nature of the parent’s sex work and an impact on their child. Many judges appeared to draw adverse inferences about a sex worker’s parenting abilities based on labels. As such, I conclude that stigma and assumptions about sex work and sex workers appear to play bigger roles in custody and access disputes than evidence about the impact, if any, that a parent’s engagement in sex work has on a child. The twenty-six allegation cases suggest that sex work is assumed to be incompatible with parenting by the community at large, further highlighting societal stigma against sex worker parents.

I submit that stigma has no place in the courtroom. As a legal community, we must ensure that stigma stays out of legal decisions. Reducing stigma is particularly important in proceedings involving such marginalized populations as sex workers, and high-stakes outcomes as custody and access to one’s own children.

I do not argue that sex work will never be relevant to custody and access disputes. The presence of sex work likely is relevant in many cases. The sociological studies and the case law support a reasonable concern that parental involvement in sex work may increase the risk of harm to a child, in part due to the high correlation between street-based sex work and shared precarities. Further, there are aspects of sex work—such as bringing clients into the home, as occurred in DD—that could directly expose a child to a risk of harm. I agree that society workers and courts can and should exercise caution and make inquiries into the specific facts of the case. However, the case law suggests that such inquiries are not always made.

Legal findings must be based on admissible evidence, not assumptions. Courts should not draw negative conclusions about a parent based on a label. I suggest that so long as sex work remains publicly denounced—by all members of society, from individuals to Parliament—sex worker parents will be vulnerable to the negative stigma and stereotypes about sex work when authorities cast judgment on what is in the best interests of their children.
I am confident that reducing stigma against sex workers in the courtroom is not a pipe dream. As noted, the case law provides some examples of judges who did not appear to jump to default conclusions that sex work is inherently harmful, particularly Justice Shelton’s neutral description of the mother as a dancer in the opening paragraphs of Rivest-Marier.\(^{323}\) Further, courts have successfully moved away from stigma-based assumptions about a parent in other contexts. As previously discussed, with respect to substance abuse, courts recognize that their analyses must consider whether the parent’s drug use actually causes harm to the child.\(^{324}\) Drug use alone is understood to be insufficient: courts must find a corresponding negative impact on the child.\(^{325}\)

Historically, children of LGBTQA+ parents were assumed to be at risk of harm simply due to their parent’s sexual orientation or gender identity.\(^{326}\) For example, a father in Children’s Aid Society of Brant v. M(S) was described as having “severe social maladjustment and acting-out behaviour over a period of years during his childhood, including ... gender identity issues.”\(^{327}\) The Court noted that the father “had not learned how to be an adequate father”, in part because the father “has issues regarding gender identity and cross-dressing and is in denial with respect to them.”\(^{328}\)

In Bezaire v. Bezaire, His Honor Judge McMahon ordered that the mother, a lesbian, must refrain from living with any other person without the approval of the court as a condition for custody of the children.\(^{329}\) He reasoned that he was “attempting to improve the situation and that includes navigating any open, declared and avowed lesbian or homosexual relationship.”\(^{330}\) The mother subsequently moved in with a lesbian partner. The father successfully applied for a change order, with Judge McMahon ruling that the mother’s “changing of relationships, even the changing of lesbian partners, indicate to this court a very

\(^{323}\) Rivest-Marier, supra note 277.
\(^{324}\) DB-S, supra note 219 at para 200.
\(^{325}\) In DB-S, \textit{ibid} at para 200, the Court notes that “Use of marijuana, in and of itself, does not indicate incompetent parenting, absent some evidence that the drug use negatively affects the parent’s abilities”.
\(^{328}\) \textit{ibid} at para 28.
\(^{329}\) Bezaire v Bezaire (1980), 20 RFL (2d) 358, 1980 CanLII 3623 (ONCA) (reports for trial and change order decisions unavailable) [Bezaire].
\(^{330}\) \textit{ibid} at 361.
deep-rooted instability in Mrs. Bezaire.” While the mother’s appeal of Judge McMahon’s change order was dismissed, Justice Arnup of the Court of Appeal stated the following in response to Judge McMahon’s comments on the mother’s sexual orientation:

In my view, homosexuality, either as a tendency, a proclivity or a practised way of life, is not in itself alone a ground for refusing custody to the parent with respect to whom such evidence is given. The question is and must always be what effect upon the welfare of the children that aspect of the parent’s make-up and life-style has, and it will therefore be a question of evidence in that very case as to whether what has been shown to exist has or may tend to have effects adverse to the welfare of the children.

Writing in dissent, Justice Wilson added that, in her view, “homosexuality is a neutral and not a negative factor as far as parenting skills are concerned.”

Further progress is seen in Whyte v. Whyte. In Whyte, the father underwent scrutiny because the mother alleged that he was homosexual and a pedophile. The two allegations were coupled together throughout the decision. Justice Grant of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia concluded that there was “no finding that he has sexually abused the child or that his sexual orientation is alleged. ... From the objective evidence, the father has not been shown to be a pedophile nor to be homosexual.” Justice Grant’s decision provides an example of judicial movement away from relying upon stigma and requiring actual evidence of harm, ruling that “[a]s to the sexual orientation I am not satisfied that, standing alone, such would disentitle a parent to custody. Such cases are decided on the individual facts of each case.”

Sex worker parents are largely denied the benefit of inquiry into causation. However, with awareness, education, and effort, legal actors can work to promote the same shift towards an “evidence-based understanding” for sex workers that we have already seen for LGBTQA+ parents and parents with substance abuse issues.

331 Ibid at 363.
332 Ibid at 365.
333 Ibid at 367.
334 Whyte v Whyte (1991), 101 NSR (2d) 249, 1991 CanLII 4480 (NSSC) [Whyte].
335 Ibid.
336 Ibid.
337 Lewis, Shaver, & Maticka-Tyndal, supra note 65 at 205.
Areas for future research

My research was exploratory. The results suggest that sex worker parents are stigmatized in custody and access disputes due to their careers. Further research is required to understand the true impact of sex work on trial outcomes. Research comparing case law involving sex worker parents with non-sex worker parents facing similar shared precarities is necessary to see the real impact of sex worker status at trial. Cases involving sex worker parents who did not experience shared precarities would also be illuminative. As noted, I did not locate any such cases. Perhaps examples would arise through case file reviews, or interviews. Follow-up research could also be undertaken as more cases are brought and decided under the CYFSA, 2017.338

My results are further limited by the fact that many Child Protection and Family Law cases resolve before trial.339 According to the results of a Survey on the Practice of Family Law in Canada from the Department of Justice, practitioners reported that 53.8% of divorces involving custody issues and 34.2% of cases involving access issues likely require a trial and judicial decision in order to be resolved. Qualitative research could be done to learn about the experiences of sex worker parents involved in custody and access disputes, and the impact of their careers throughout the legal proceedings.

Finally, the Black Lives Matter and Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women movements remind us that there is much work to be done regarding the impact of systemic racism on Indigenous, Black, and People of Colour (IBPOC) including during interactions with authorities.340 Black and Indigenous children are overrepresented in the Ontario Child Welfare system.341 Beneficial research could focus on the intersections between race and racism, sex work, and society and legal players involved in custody and

338 Supra note 4.
access proceedings to determine if IBPOC sex workers experience additional negativity to the situations of sex workers described in this research.

For Indigenous families that receive Child Protection services, Parliament recently passed new Child Protection legislation: An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families.\textsuperscript{342} This Act contains a new list of factors that courts must consider when rendering orders in the best interests of Indigenous children\textsuperscript{343} and addresses many of the shared precarities faced by sex workers. Section 15 states that indigenous children “must not be apprehended solely on the basis of his or her socio-economic conditions, including poverty, lack of adequate housing or infrastructure or the state of health of his or her parent or the care provider.”\textsuperscript{344} Work could be done to explore the impact of this Act on Indigenous sex worker parents involved in Child Protection proceedings and their children.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, SC 2019, c 24.
\item Ibid, s 10(1)-(3).
\item Ibid, s 15.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Conclusion

No parent should fear being separated from their child due to a label. However, in every reported custody and access decision involving a sex worker parent, the parent’s involvement in sex work was presented as an unfavourable aspect of the parent and their lifestyle, or otherwise appeared to have a negative influence on the parent’s claim. I conclude that in reported case law in Ontario from the last decade, sex work was more often treated as a negative quality in a parent rather than as an aspect of a parent’s life that warranted further factual exploration.

Of the Child Protection cases, sex work, or simply allegations of same, contributed to society decisions to investigate, conclude that a child is in need of protection, apprehend, and/or commence proceedings. At trial, courts have relied upon the presence of sex work to rule that it would not be in the child’s best interests to be returned for the parent. Courts implied that sex work prevented the parents’ abilities to provide stability, permanency, or structure for the child moving forward, or rendered the child at increased risk of physical harm.

For Family Law cases, we saw that parental involvement in sex work was twice raised on cross-examination to discredit evidence of good parenting, contributed to another parent’s decision to bring claims for custody, and led to alienation. In nearly every decision, courts did not refer to any evidence regarding the specific nature of the sex worker parent’s work or make any direct connection between the sex work and an impact on parenting or the child.

This research may be built upon by comparing my results with cases involving parents who have never engaged in sex work and experience shared precarities. As cases are brought and decided under the CYFSA, 2017 and An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, we may begin to see cases involving sex worker parents who did not experience shared precarities. As an alternative to doctrinal legal research, richer data on the true impact of sex work throughout a proceeding may be available through case file reviews and interviews.

Regardless of format, ample work must be done on the impact of stigma and systemic racism on IBPOC sex workers during interactions with legal authorities, including those that impact their children.

Custody and access orders should only be based on evidence. Assumptions about sex work and sex workers contribute to the uphill battle that many already face in Child Protection and Family Law courts. The case law supports the unfortunate conclusions from earlier studies that many sex workers, particularly street-based, experience multiple and intersecting social and economic barriers that can complicate parenting. We must not allow stigma to be added to the list.
**Bibliography**

**Legislation**


*Bill C-36, the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act*, SC 2014, c 25 (assented to November 6, 2014).

*Bill C-78: An Act to amend the Divorce Act, the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act and the Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act and to make consequential amendments to another Act*, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2019 (as passed on June 21, 2019).


*Divorce Act*, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp).


*The Criminal Code, 1892*, SC 1892, c 29.

**Jurisprudence**

*Angus v Angus*, 2017 ONSC 4911.

*Avakian v Natiotis*, 2012 ONCJ 584.

*Aza v Zagroudntsiki*, 2014 ONCJ 293.


*Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford*, 2010 ONSC 4264.

*Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford*, 2013 SCC 72.

*CAS of London and Middlesex v TY*, 2017 ONSC 3460.

*CAS v NA-M*, 2018 ONSC 978.

*CAS v TS and MOU and CS*, 2020 ONSC 879

*CCAS v BLS, GKI, GJ SD*, 2014 ONSC 5513.

*CCAS v JF-G and NS*, 2013 ONSC 6434.

*CCAS v LM*, 2012 ONSC 1778.

Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v JB, 2013 ONCJ 583.
Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v LDE, 2012 ONCJ 530.
Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v TTL, 2018 ONCJ 403.
Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v TTL and SS, 2019 ONCJ 530.
Children’s Aid Society of Algoma v LP, 2011 ONCJ 712.
Children’s Aid Society of Algoma v RS, 2013 ONCJ 688.
Children’s Aid Society of Brant v M[S], [2003] OJ No 4584, 127 ACWS (3d) 473 (ONCJ).
Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v AS et al, 2017 ONSC 2226.
Children’s Aid Society of Nipissing and Parry Sound v B(J), 2010 ONCJ 34.
Children’s Aid Society of (Ottawa) v JR, 2019 ONSC 3012.
Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v C-D, 2014 ONSC 6954.
Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v CN, 2013 ONSC 402.
Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v CN, 2018 ONSC 3988.
Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v RP, 2010 ONSC 7106.
Children’s Aid Society of Oxford County v CL, 2019 ONCJ 923.
Children’s Aid Society of the Districts of Sudbury and Manitoulin v CH, 2018 ONCJ 453.
Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo v CT, 2017 ONCA 931.
Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v DB-S, 2013 ONCJ 405.
Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v JG, 2020 ONSC 1135.
Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v KS, 2015 ONCJ 63.
Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v SAP et al, 2019 ONSC 3482.
Children’s Aid Society v NJ-L, 2016 ONSC 5889.
Dafer v Khanafar, 2016 ONSC 5969.
DD v Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, 2015 ONSC 4197.
DD v Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, 2015 ONCA 903.
DE v CS, 2017 ONCJ 668.
Facchini v Bourre, 2015 ONSC 763.
Fias v Souto, 2015 ONSC 880.
Griffiths v Leonard, 2010 ONSC 4824.
GTB v ZBB, 2014 ONCJ 382.
Hackett v Sever, 2017 ONCJ 193.
Hernandez v Nikas, 2017 ONSC 162.
HP v PLC, 2013 ONCJ 399.
JBH v TLG, 2014 ONSC 3569.
Kawartha-Haliburton Children’s Aid Society v. MW, 2019 ONCA 316.
Lopez v Dotzko, 2011 ONSC 6778.
Melanie Gillett v James Gratton, 2018 ONSC 362.
MMG v GWS, 2006 SKQB 367.
Native Child and Family Services of Toronto v DC, 2010 ONSC 1038.
New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G (J), [1999] 3 SCR 46, 1999 CanLII 653 (SCC).
Porter v Hamilton, 2011 ONSC 5792.
R v Anwar, 2020 ONCJ 103.
Rivest-Marier v Emond, 2017 ONSC 4197.
Sangha v Meighan, 2012 ONSC 2362.
TEH v GJR, 2016 ONCJ 156.
The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v CF, 2011 ONSC 3335.
The Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v CH, 2014 ONSC 3731.
The Ottawa Children’s Aid Society v CS, 2016 ONSC 3828.
VB v MM, 2016 ONCJ 98.

Secondary sources
Anonymous, “Mama Tiger Rising” in Rebecca Bromwich & Monique Marie Dejong, eds, Mothers, mothering and sex work (Brampton, ON: Demeter Press, 2015).
Basu, Ambar & Mohan J Dutta, "‘We are mothers first’: Localocentric articulation of sex worker identity as a key in HIV/AIDS communication” (2011) 51:2 Women & Health 106.


Bromwich, Rebecca & Monique Marie Dejong, eds, Mothers, mothering and sex work (Brampton, ON: Demeter Press, 2015).


Canada Department of Justice, Prostitution Criminal Law Reform: Bill C-36, the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act – Fact Sheet (September 14, 2018) online: Government of Canada, Department of Justice <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/other-autre/c36fs_fi/>.


Granger-Brown, Alison et al, “The Spectrum of Motherhood” in Rebecca Bromwich & Monique Marie Dejong, eds, Mothers, mothering and sex work (Brampton, ON: Demeter Press, 2015).

House of Commons Debates, 43-1, No 014 (February 4, 2020) (Hon Laurel Collins).


Murnan, Aaron, *Using Qualitative Interviews to Understand the Treatment Needs and Barriers of Mothers Engaged in Prostitution and their Children*, The Ohio State University, 2019 [Dissertation].


O’Doherty, Tamara, “Victimization in Off-Street Sex Industry Work” (June 2011) 17:7 Violence Against Women 944.


Piccillo, Juliana, “We’re here. We’re whores. We’re parenting.” (February 20, 2018) online: Red Umbrella Babies: Sex work & Parenting, an anthology <https://www.redumbrellababies.com/single-post/2018/02/20/Were-here-Were-whores-Were-parenting>.


PJ Starr et al, “Red Umbrella Babies: By Sex Worker Parents and Their Children” in Rebecca Bromwich & Monique Marie Dejong, eds, Mothers, mothering and sex work (Brampton, ON: Demeter Press, 2015).

Stranger, Ella, “I’m a Sex Worker, and This is What I’ll tell my Child”, (March 18, 2016), online: Elephant Journal: <https://www.elephantjournal.com/2016/03/im-a-sex-worker-and-this-is-what-ill-tell-my-child/>.


## Appendix A: Coding tables

### Child Protection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full citation</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Judge(s)</th>
<th>Issue(s) and ruling(s)</th>
<th>Relief sought</th>
<th>Held</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hearing:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Finding</td>
<td>Orders</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judgment:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties and child(ren)</th>
<th>Applicant/Respondent(s)</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Sex worker status</th>
<th>Other (incl. race)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Child(ren)</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Other (incl. race)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context, incl:</th>
<th>Overview</th>
<th>Facts</th>
<th>Analysis (BI)</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex trade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best interests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug use</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Julie’s comments</th>
<th>Noted up (w/ date)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full citation</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue(s) and ruling(s)</th>
<th>Relief sought</th>
<th>CLRA or Divorce Act/section</th>
<th>Held</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Custody:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties and child(ren)</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Sex worker status</th>
<th>Other (incl. race)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Applicant(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child(ren)</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Other (incl. race)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context, incl:</th>
<th>Overview</th>
<th>Facts</th>
<th>Analysis (BI)</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex trade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best interests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug use</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Julie’s comments       | Noted up (w/ date) | | | | |
Appendix B: Chart comparing relevant Child Protection legislative provisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paramount purpose</th>
<th>Child and Family Services Act</th>
<th>Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (1) The paramount purpose of this Act is to promote the best interests, protection and well being of children.</td>
<td>1 (1) The paramount purpose of this Act is to promote the best interests, protection and well-being of children.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty to report</td>
<td>72 (1) Despite the provisions of any other Act, if a person, including a person who performs professional or official duties with respect to children, has reasonable grounds to suspect one of the following, the person shall forthwith report the suspicion and the information on which it is based to a society:</td>
<td>125 (1) Despite the provisions of any other Act, if a person, including a person who performs professional or official duties with respect to children, has reasonable grounds to suspect one of the following, the person shall immediately report the suspicion and the information on which it is based to a society:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The child has suffered physical harm, inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s,</td>
<td>1. The child has suffered physical harm inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child, or</td>
<td>i. failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child, or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child.</td>
<td>ii. pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. There is a risk that the child is likely to suffer physical harm inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s,</td>
<td>2. There is a risk that the child is likely to suffer physical harm inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child, or</td>
<td>i. failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child, or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child.</td>
<td>ii. pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The child has been sexually molested or sexually exploited, by the person having charge of the child or by another person where the person having charge of the child knows or should know of the possibility of sexual molestation or sexual exploitation and fails to protect the child.</td>
<td>3. The child has been sexually abused or sexually exploited by the person having charge of the child or by another person where the person having charge of the child knows or should know of the possibility of sexual abuse or sexual exploitation and fails to protect the child.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. There is a risk that the child is likely to be sexually molested or sexually exploited as described in paragraph 3.</td>
<td>4. There is a risk that the child is likely to be sexually abused or sexually exploited as described in paragraph 3.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The child requires medical treatment to cure, prevent or alleviate physical harm or suffering and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide,</td>
<td>5. The child requires treatment to cure, prevent or alleviate physical harm or suffering and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or, where the child is incapable of consenting to the treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, refuses or is unavailable to give consent.</td>
<td>or, where the child is incapable of consenting to the treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, refuses or is unavailable to give consent.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
or refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to, the treatment.

6. The child has suffered emotional harm, demonstrated by serious,
   i. anxiety,
   ii. depression,
   iii. withdrawal,
   iv. self-destructive or aggressive behaviour, or
   v. delayed development,

and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the emotional harm suffered by the child results from the actions, failure to act or pattern of neglect on the part of the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child.

7. The child has suffered emotional harm of the kind described in subparagraph i, ii, iii, iv or v of paragraph 6 and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide, or refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to, services or treatment to remedy or alleviate the harm.

8. There is a risk that the child is likely to suffer emotional harm of the kind described in subparagraph i, ii, iii, iv or v of paragraph 6 resulting from the actions, failure to act or pattern of neglect on the part of the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child.

9. There is a risk that the child is likely to suffer emotional harm of the kind described in subparagraph i, ii, iii, iv or v of paragraph 6 and that the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide, or refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to, services or treatment to prevent the harm.

10. The child suffers from a mental, emotional or developmental condition that, if not remedied, could seriously impair the child’s development and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide, or refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to, treatment to remedy or alleviate the condition.

or unable to consent to, the treatment on the child’s behalf.

6. The child has suffered emotional harm, demonstrated by serious,
   i. anxiety,
   ii. depression,
   iii. withdrawal,
   iv. self-destructive or aggressive behaviour, or
   v. delayed development,

and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the emotional harm suffered by the child results from the actions, failure to act or pattern of neglect on the part of the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child.

7. The child has suffered emotional harm of the kind described in subparagraph 6 i, ii, iii, iv or v and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide services or treatment or access to services or treatment, or, where the child is incapable of consenting to treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to, treatment to remedy or alleviate the harm.

8. There is a risk that the child is likely to suffer emotional harm of the kind described in subparagraph 6 i, ii, iii, iv or v resulting from the actions, failure to act or pattern of neglect on the part of the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child.

9. There is a risk that the child is likely to suffer emotional harm of the kind described in subparagraph 6 i, ii, iii, iv or v and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide services or treatment or access to services or treatment, or, where the child is incapable of consenting to treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to, treatment to prevent the harm.

10. The child suffers from a mental, emotional or developmental condition that, if not remedied, could seriously impair the child’s development and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide the treatment or access to the treatment, or where the child is
11. The child has been abandoned, the child’s parent has died or is unavailable to exercise his or her custodial rights over the child and has not made adequate provision for the child’s care and custody, or the child is in a residential placement and the parent refuses or is unable or unwilling to resume the child’s care and custody.

12. The child is less than 12 years old and has killed or seriously injured another person or caused serious damage to another person’s property, services or treatment are necessary to prevent a recurrence and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide, or refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to, those services or treatment.

13. The child is less than 12 years old and has on more than one occasion injured another person or caused loss or damage to another person’s property, with the encouragement of the person having charge of the child or because of that person’s failure or inability to supervise the child adequately.

incapable of consenting to the treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to, treatment to remedy or alleviate the condition.

11. The child’s parent has died or is unavailable to exercise custodial rights over the child and has not made adequate provision for the child’s care and custody, or the child is in a residential placement and the parent refuses or is unable or unwilling to resume the child’s care and custody.

12. The child is younger than 12 and has killed or seriously injured another person or caused serious damage to another person’s property, services or treatment are necessary to prevent a recurrence and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide services or treatment or access to services or treatment, or, where the child is incapable of consenting to treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to treatment.

13. The child is younger than 12 and has on more than one occasion injured another person or caused loss or damage to another person’s property, with the encouragement of the person having charge of the child or because of that person’s failure or inability to supervise the child adequately.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society may initiate proceedings</th>
<th>40 (1) A society may apply to the court to determine whether a child is in need of protection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temporary order for care and custody</td>
<td>51(2) Where a hearing is adjourned, the court shall make a temporary order for care and custody providing that the child,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention under this Part;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person referred to in clause (a), subject to the society’s supervision and on such reasonable terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) be placed in the care and custody of a person other than the person referred to in clause (a), with the consent of that other person, subject to the society’s supervision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81 (1) A society may apply to the court to determine whether a child is in need of protection.</td>
<td>94 (2) Where a hearing is adjourned, the court shall make a temporary order for care and custody providing that the child,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention under this Part;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person referred to in clause (a), subject to the society’s supervision and on such reasonable terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) be placed in the care and custody of a person other than the person referred to in clause (a), with the consent of that other person, subject to the society’s supervision and on such reasonable terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and on such reasonable terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate; or (d) remain or be placed in the care and custody of the society, but not be placed in,

(i) a place of secure custody as defined in Part IV (Youth Justice), or
(ii) a place of open temporary detention as defined in that Part that has not been designated as a place of safety.

Criteria
(3) The court shall not make an order under clause (2) (c) or (d) unless the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer harm and that the child cannot be protected adequately by an order under clause (2) (a) or (b).

Finding that a child is in need of protection
37 (2) A child is in need of protection where,

(a) the child has suffered physical harm, inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s,

(i) failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child,
(ii) pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child;

(b) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer physical harm inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s,

(i) failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child,
(ii) pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child;

(c) the child has been sexually molested or sexually exploited, by the person having charge of the child or by another person where the person having charge of the child knows or should know of the possibility of sexual molestation or sexual exploitation and fails to protect the child;

(d) there is a risk that the child is likely to be sexually abused or sexually exploited as described in clause (c);
(d) there is a risk that the child is likely to be sexually molested or sexually exploited as described in clause (c);

(e) the child requires medical treatment to cure, prevent or alleviate physical harm or suffering and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide, or refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to, the treatment;

(f) the child has suffered emotional harm, demonstrated by serious,
   (i) anxiety,
   (ii) depression,
   (iii) withdrawal,
   (iv) self-destructive or aggressive behaviour, or
   (v) delayed development,

   and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the emotional harm suffered by the child results from the actions, failure to act or pattern of neglect on the part of the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child;

(f.1) the child has suffered emotional harm of the kind described in subclause (f) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or (v) and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide, or refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to, services or treatment to remedy or alleviate the harm;

(g) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer emotional harm of the kind described in subclause (f) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or (v) resulting from the actions, failure to act or pattern of neglect on the part of the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child;

(g.1) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer emotional harm of the kind described in subclause (f) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or (v) and that the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide, or refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to, services or treatment to prevent the harm;

(h) the child suffers from a mental, emotional or developmental condition that, if not

(e) the child requires treatment to cure, prevent or alleviate physical harm or suffering and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide the treatment or access to the treatment, or, where the child is incapable of consenting to the treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 and the parent is a substitute decision-maker for the child, the parent refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to the treatment on the child’s behalf;

(f) the child has suffered emotional harm, demonstrated by serious,
   (i) anxiety,
   (ii) depression,
   (iii) withdrawal,
   (iv) self-destructive or aggressive behaviour, or
   (v) delayed development,

   and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the emotional harm suffered by the child results from the actions, failure to act or pattern of neglect on the part of the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child;

(g) the child has suffered emotional harm of the kind described in subclause (f) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or (v) and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide services or treatment or access to services or treatment, or, where the child is incapable of consenting to treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to the treatment to remedy or alleviate the harm;

(h) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer emotional harm of the kind described in subclause (f) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or (v) resulting from the actions, failure to act or pattern of neglect on the part of the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child;

(i) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer emotional harm of the kind described in subclause (f) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or (v) and that the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide services or treatment or access to services or treatment, or, where the child is incapable of consenting to treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, refuses
remedied, could seriously impair the child’s development and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide, or refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to, treatment to remedy or alleviate the condition;

(i) the child has been abandoned, the child’s parent has died or is unavailable to exercise his or her custodial rights over the child and has not made adequate provision for the child’s care and custody, or the child is in a residential placement and the parent refuses or is unable or unwilling to resume the child’s care and custody;

(j) the child is less than twelve years old and has killed or seriously injured another person or caused serious damage to another person’s property, services or treatment are necessary to prevent a recurrence and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide, or refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to, those services or treatment;

(k) the child is less than twelve years old and has on more than one occasion injured another person or caused loss or damage to another person’s property, with the encouragement of the person having charge of the child or because of that person’s failure or inability to supervise the child adequately;

(l) the child’s parent is unable to care for the child and the child is brought before the court with the parent’s consent and, where the child is twelve years of age or older, with the child’s consent, to be dealt with under this Part; or

(m) the child is 16 or 17 years of age and a prescribed circumstance or condition exists.

| Protection orders | 57 (1) Where the court finds that a child is in need of protection and is satisfied that intervention through a court order is or is unavailable or unable to consent to treatment to prevent the harm; (j) the child suffers from a mental, emotional or developmental condition that, if not remedied, could seriously impair the child’s development and the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child does not provide treatment or access to treatment, or where the child is incapable of consenting to treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to the treatment to remedy or alleviate the condition; (k) the child's parent has died or is unavailable to exercise custodial rights over the child and has not made adequate provision for the child’s care and custody, or the child is in a residential placement and the parent refuses or is unable or unwilling to resume the child’s care and custody; (l) the child is younger than 12 and has killed or seriously injured another person or caused serious damage to another person’s property, with the encouragement of the person having charge of the child or because of that person’s failure or inability to supervise the child adequately; (m) the child is younger than 12 and has on more than one occasion injured another person or caused loss or damage to another person’s property, with the encouragement of the person having charge of the child or because of that person’s failure or inability to supervise the child adequately; (n) the child’s parent is unable to care for the child and the child is brought before the court with the parent’s consent and, where the child is 12 or older, with the child’s consent, for the matter to be dealt with under this Part; or (o) the child is 16 or 17 and a prescribed circumstance or condition exists. |
necessary to protect the child in the future, the court shall make one of the following orders or an order under section 57.1, in the child’s best interests:

Supervision order
1. That the child be placed in the care and custody of a parent or another person, subject to the supervision of the society, for a specified period of at least three months and not more than 12 months.

Society wardship
2. That the child be made a ward of the society and be placed in its care and custody for a specified period not exceeding twelve months.

Crown wardship
3. That the child be made a ward of the Crown, until the wardship is terminated under section 65.2 or expires under subsection 71 (1), and be placed in the care of the society.

Consecutive orders of society wardship and supervision
4. That the child be made a ward of the society under paragraph 2 for a specified period and then be returned to a parent or another person under paragraph 1, for a period or periods not exceeding an aggregate of twelve months.

Best interests
37 (3) Where a person is directed in this Part to make an order or determination in the best interests of a child, the person shall take into consideration those of the following circumstances of the case that he or she considers relevant:

1. The child’s physical, mental and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to meet those needs.
2. The child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development.
3. The child’s cultural background.
4. The religious faith, if any, in which the child is being raised.
5. The importance for the child’s development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family.

74 (3) Where a person is directed in this Part to make an order or determination in the best interests of a child, the person shall,

(a) consider the child’s views and wishes, given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(b) in the case of a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child, consider the importance, in recognition of the uniqueness of First Nations, Inuit and Métis cultures, heritages and traditions, of preserving the child’s cultural identity and connection to community, in addition to the considerations under clauses (a) and (c); and

(c) consider any other circumstance of the case that the person considers relevant, including,
6. The child’s relationships and emotional ties to a parent, sibling, relative, other member of the child’s extended family or member of the child’s community.
7. The importance of continuity in the child’s care and the possible effect on the child of disruption of that continuity.
8. The merits of a plan for the child’s care proposed by a society, including a proposal that the child be placed for adoption or adopted, compared with the merits of the child remaining with or returning to a parent.
9. The child’s views and wishes, if they can be reasonably ascertained.
10. The effects on the child of delay in the disposition of the case.
11. The risk that the child may suffer harm through being removed from, kept away from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent.
12. The degree of risk, if any, that justified the finding that the child is in need of protection.
13. Any other relevant circumstance.

(4) Where a person is directed in this Part to make an order or determination in the best interests of a child and the child is an Indian or native person, the person shall take into consideration the importance, in recognition of the uniqueness of Indian and native culture, heritage and traditions, of preserving the child’s cultural identity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Past conduct</th>
<th>50 (1) Despite anything in the Evidence Act, in any proceeding under this Part,</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) the court may consider the past conduct of a person toward any child if that person is caring for or has access to or may care for or have access to a child who is the subject of the proceeding; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) any oral or written statement or report that the court considers relevant to the proceeding, including a transcript, exhibit or finding or the reasons for a decision in an earlier civil or criminal proceeding, is admissible into evidence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Past conduct</th>
<th>93 (1) Despite anything in the Evidence Act, in any proceeding under this Part,</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) the court may consider the past conduct of a person toward any child if that person is caring for or has access to or may care for or have access to a child who is the subject of the proceeding; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) any oral or written statement or report that the court considers relevant to the proceeding, including a transcript, exhibit or finding or the reasons for a decision in an earlier civil or criminal proceeding, is admissible into evidence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix C: Chart comparing relevant Family Law legislative provisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Children’s Law Reform Act</th>
<th>Divorce Act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The purposes of this Part are, (a) to ensure that applications to the courts in respect of custody of, incidents of custody of, access to and guardianship for children will be determined on the basis of the best interests of the children</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commencing proceedings</th>
<th>Application for custody or access</th>
<th>16 (1) A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses or by any other person, make an order respecting the custody of or the access to, or the custody of and access to, any or all children of the marriage.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 (1) A parent of a child or any other person, including a grandparent, may apply to a court for an order respecting custody of or access to the child or determining any aspect of the incidents of custody of the child.</td>
<td>(3) A person, other than a spouse, may not make an application under subsection (1) or (2) without leave of the court.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orders available</th>
<th>28 (1) The court to which an application is made under section 21, (a) by order may grant the custody of or access to the child to one or more persons; (b) by order may determine any aspect of the incidents of the right to custody or access; and (c) may make such additional order as the court considers necessary and proper in the circumstances, including an order,</th>
<th>16 (4) The court may make an order under this section granting custody of, or access to, any or all children of the marriage to any one or more persons.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) limiting the duration, frequency, manner or location of contact or communication between any of the parties, or between a party and the child, (ii) prohibiting a party or other person from engaging in specified conduct in the presence of the child or at any time when the person is responsible for the care of the child, (iii) prohibiting a party from changing the child’s residence, school or day care facility without the consent of another party or an order of the court, (iv) prohibiting a party from removing the child from Ontario without the consent of another party or an order of the court, (v) requiring the delivery, to the court or to a person or body specified by the court, of the child’s passport, the child’s health card within the meaning of the Health Act.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Insurance Act or any other document relating to the child that the court may specify,
(vi) requiring a party to give information or to consent to the release of information respecting the health, education and welfare of the child to another party or other person specified by the court, or
(vii) requiring a party to facilitate communication by the child with another party or other person specified by the court in a manner that is appropriate for the child.

| Best interests | Best interests of child
|----------------|-------------------------------------|
| (2) The court shall consider all the child’s needs and circumstances, including,
| (a) the love, affection and emotional ties between the child and,
| (i) each person, including a parent or grandparent, entitled to or claiming custody of or access to the child,
| (ii) other members of the child’s family who reside with the child, and
| (iii) persons involved in the child’s care and upbringing;
| (b) the child’s views and preferences, if they can reasonably be ascertained;
| (c) the length of time the child has lived in a stable home environment;
| (d) the ability and willingness of each person applying for custody of the child to provide the child with guidance and education, the necessaries of life and any special needs of the child;
| (e) the plan proposed by each person applying for custody of or access to the child for the child’s care and upbringing;
| (f) the permanence and stability of the family unit with which it is proposed that the child will live;
| (g) the ability of each person applying for custody of or access to the child to act as a parent; and
| (h) any familial relationship between the child and each person who is a party to the application. |
| 16 (8) In making an order under this section, the court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the marriage as determined by reference to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child. |
| Past conduct | Past conduct  
|----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| 24 (3) A person’s past conduct shall be considered only,  
(a) in accordance with subsection (4); or  
(b) if the court is satisfied that the conduct is otherwise relevant to the person’s ability to act as a parent. | 2006, c. 1, s. 3 (1); 2016, c. 23, s. 7 (2).  
Violence and abuse  
(4) In assessing a person’s ability to act as a parent, the court shall consider whether the person has at any time committed violence or abuse against,  
(a) his or her spouse;  
(b) a parent of the child to whom the application relates;  
(c) a member of the person’s household; or  
(d) any child. | 16 (9) In making an order under this section, the court shall not take into consideration the past conduct of any person unless the conduct is relevant to the ability of that person to act as a parent of a child. |